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"[T]he docket is 'dumbed-down' by an overwhelming number of
routine or trivial appeals .... "
Judge Edith H. Jones1
"We federal judges are simply unable to abandon our notion of the
appellate courts as small, cohesive entities operating in a pristine
and sheltered atmosphere."
Judge Stephen Reinhardt 2
INTRODUCTION

The federal circuit courts, responding to a dramatic increase in
caseload, have transformed themselves radically in the past quarter
century.3 Once the tradition and practice was to hear oral argument

I

Edith H. Jones, Back to The Futurefor FederalAppeals Courts: RationingFederaIjustieby
Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX L. REv. 1485, 1493 (1995) (reviewing THOMAS E.
BAKER, RATIONING JUsTIcE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
(1994)).
2 Stephen Reinhardt, Surveys Without Solutions: Another Study of the United States Courts

of Appeals, 73 TEx. L REv. 1505, 1513 (1995) [hereinafter Surveys] (reviewing THOMAS E.
BAKER, RATIONING JUSTIcE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF

APPEALS (1994)).

3 The increase in caseload is well-documented. The numbers are staggering. In
1960, 3,899 appeals were filed before 68 federal circuit judges; the comparable figures for
1994 are 48,322 filings and 179 judges. See Committee on Long Range Planning,Judicial
Conference of the United States 2 (1994) (1960 data); L. RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BusiNESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1994 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, at 25, B-1 (1994 data).
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in almost all cases and for a judge, working virtually alone, to write a

fully reasoned opinion explaining the outcome and making it available for all to see. Today those procedures have beer sadly truncated;
oral argument and formal publication are now the exception rather\
than the rule. Moreover, the judge no longer sits alone in isolated

concentration. Rather, the judge is now the manager of a staff, whose
primary role is to conserve judicial effort by screening cases and participating significantly in the decision making process. In other
words, the modem federal appellate decision is a team effort. In most
cases, the judge's role is primarily or even exclusively supervisory.
Clerks and central staff screen the appeals to determine how much

judge time should be allocated to each case. These parajudicial personnel also recommend whether oral argument should be granted

and whether a full opinion (or, indeed, any opinion) should be written. Not only is judge time rationed, but the key decisions allocating

judge time are not even made by judges. Thus, an effective right to
appeal error to the circuit courts no longer exists; instead, litigants
must petition the staff to obtain access to thejudges. In short, despite
their statutory and historical role as courts of appeal, 4 the circuit
courts have become certiorari courts.
These developments have had deplorable effects. The overall
quality of the work of the circuit courts has deteriorated markedly.
Judge Reinhardt spoke for many when he observed: "Those who believe we are doing the same quality work that we did in the past are
simply fooling themselves." 5 In addition, the transformation has created different tracks of justice for different cases and different litigants: important cases (usually measured by monetary value) and
powerful litigants receive greater judicial attention than less important cases and weaker litigants. At one end of the spectrum, perhaps
in a major securities case, the judges play a very active role: they listen
to oral argument, work hard preparing opinions which are circulated
among and read carefully by their colleagues, and ultimately have the
final opinion published in the Federal Reporter as a precedent. A
stark contrast exists at the other end of the spectrum. For example, in
an appeal involving the denial of social security benefits, central staff
may read the briefs, recommend whether oral argument should be
This represents a 1240% increase in filings, with only a 263% increase in judges; see also
JUDITH A. MCKENNA, FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, STRucTuRAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 18 (1993) (providing data on recent caseload changes).

In other words, in 1960, there were 57 filings for each appellate judge; the comparable
figure for 1994 is 270. There can be no doubt that the caseload pressure has grown dramatically over the past several decades.
4 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) ("the courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.").
5 Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the FederalCourts-TooFewJudges, Too Many Cases,
79 A.BA. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 [hereinafter Too Few, Too Many].
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heard, and prepare a draft opinion. Thejudge's own clerks then scan
the reports from central staff to see if they make sense and should be
followed. In these cases, actual judge time probably consists of limited
review of the staff recommendations. 6 The draft opinion is not published, and sometimes no opinion (other than a brief affirmation) is
issued at all. Of course, many variations between the two extremes
will exist, limited only by the individual judge's conscience and
wisdom.
That justice is dispensed on different tracks is not really a secret,
although it is not generally known outside judicial circles. Sometimes
a candid judge will expose the process. Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked a few years back that:
The person who actually decides an appeal is an appellate judgethe person who supervises the processing of such appeals to ultimate decision, though he may be called an appellate judge, is really
more of an administrator. Instead of personally delving into and
casting a vote on, say, ten cases, he takes part in supervising law
clerks who delve into twenty or thirty cases, he approves what the
law clerks have done in half or two-thirds of that number, and personally delves into and decides the remainder .... IT] he appellate
judge... plays a different role than the appellate judge of a genera7
tion ago.
Justice Breyer wrote in a similar vein when he was Chief Judge of the
First Circuit:
Not all 1,200 appeals require the full time and attention of appellate judges. Many appeals disappear from the docket ....

Others

present only a simple fact-related issue.... Our office of four staff
attorneys will review records and briefs in many such cases, write
memoranda and proposed dispositions, and circulate them with the
briefs and records to panels of three judges. Typically, there is littlefor
the threejudges to review, and the appeal takes only a little of their time.8
6 The judge might in fact only review an elbow clerk's review of the staff
recommendations.
7 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 1976), in Carolyn Dineen King, Comment, A Matter of Conscience, 28 Hous.
L. REv. 955, 958 (1991).
8 Stephen Breyer, AdministeringJusticein the First Circui424 SUroLK U. L. REv. 29, 3233 (1990) (emphasis added). Breyer later observed that there may be "some adverse effect
on litigants' perceptionsof procedural fairness." Id. at 43 n.41. See also FRAwK KAUFMAN Er
AL, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERALJUDICIAL

IMPROVEMENTS, rprinted in, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROcESs AFTER A CENTURY OF GROWrH, 125 F.R.D. 523, 532 (1989) [hereinafter
ABA REPORT] (arguing that reform "is necessary to preserve and enhance the distinctive

role of the federal courts in our society."); Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil
AppeaL" A Late-Century View, 38 S.C. L. REv. 411, 424-25 (1987) ("The work of correction
takes time that circuit judges no longer feel they have. And making the performance of
that work visible and convincing to the bar and the public requires much more time than
the judges are allowed by circumstance.").
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The implications of these changes are enormous. Federal appellate courts are treating litigants differently, a difference that generally
turns on a litigant's ability to mobilize substantial private legal assistance. As a result, judicial procedures no longer permit judges to fulfill their oath of office and "administer justice without respect to
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.... ."9 In

short, those without power receive less (and different) justice.
These developments are a direct consequence of an increase in
caseload which has far out-stripped the increase in the number of
judges. Yet the transformation was not inevitable. Indeed, it need not
have occurred at all. The Judicial Establishment has steadfastly resisted the one obvious solution: 10 to ask Congress for a radical increase in the number of judges. The Judicial Establishment has
advanced various reasons for such resistance despite well-known data
and arguments to the contrary. More plausible explanations ofjudicial resistance to an increase in the number ofjudges are hard to pin
down. Among the possibilities are a strong desire to preserve the elite
status of a small judiciary and to replicate the comfortable role judges
enjoyed at the apex of a career in practice or at the academy. Besides,
it is more rewarding professionally to deal with a major securities case
than the problems of yet another losing Social Security claimant.
We do not believe that the transformation of the federal appellate courts into certiorari courts dispensing justice unequally has
taken place by design." Instead, it has been the by-product of the
effort to maintain a small, elite federal judiciary. The size of the tool
has dictated the size of the job, rather than the other way around.
Moreover, the transformation has gone largely unnoticed and virtually
without debate in the larger legal community. That is most unfortunate, for fundamental changes in our system ofjustice should not take
place without the most careful scrutiny. We hope that this Article will
advance that process. It begins with a discussion of the changes in the
circuit courts and the impact those changes have had on the appellate
process. The discussion then turns to the reason for the transformation-the efforts of the judicial establishment to maintain the judiciary at a size that is too small to handle the caseload in the traditional
28 U.S.C. § 453 (1994).
Another obvious solution, not directly addressed in this Article, would be to apportion limited judicial time more evenly. Under that sort of plan, all cases would get roughly
the same amount ofjudicial attention. For reasons that will become apparent, the judges
have never discussed this solution.
11 "[W]e should have consistent, sensible, and workable rules for managing an infinitely variable caseload. At present, we often allocate our prime resource (judges' time)
according to quixotic combinations of tradition, habit, and personal preference." Patricia
M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Coegiaaity Under Challenge,
42 MD. L. REv. 766, 776-77 (1983).
9

10
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fashion. We examine each of the relatively weak arguments used to
justify that position and then speculate on the real reasons for the
opposition to expansion. The Article concludes with a recommendation for a radical increase in the size of the federal appellate judiciary
as the only way to maintain, or, more accurately, regain the traditional
appellate process in the circuit courts.
I
SHORTCUTS TO DECISION MAKING

'"e have been forced to adopt... shortcuts to cope with the rising
volume: we hear fewer oral arguments, publish fewer opinions and
rely more heavily on law clerks and staff attorneys. The heavy volume of cases threatens the ability... to give each case the attention
12
and care it deserves."'
The traditional appellate procedure, which we have styled "the
Learned Hand model," is well known, and can be described simply.
Oral argument is heard in virtually all cases. Following a thorough
discussion among the judges in a face-to-face conference, one panel
member prepares a draft opinion, circulates the opinion among the
panel, and then revises the draft in response to their comments. The
resulting opinion carefully states the relevant facts and law, and explains why the combination of the two leads to the result.'3 Thejudge
uses a law clerk as a research tool and sounding board, but clerks have
no significant role in drafting the opinion; there is no central staff.
When the panel reaches agreement on the opinion, it is published in
a reporter accessible to everyone. That is the traditional, or Learned
4
Hand, model of appellate decision making.'
12 J. Clifford Wallace, Developing the Mission of the FederalCourts-A Method to Determine
the Size of the FederalJudiciary,27 CONN. L. REv. 851, 858 (1995).
13 "Under traditional procedure an explanatory opinion is written by a judge in almost every case." DANIELJOHN MEADOR &JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 74 (1994); see also THOMAS E. BAxR, RATIONINGJUSTICE ON APPEAL:
THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 24 (1994) ("Each judge sitting on a case
should know enough about it to make his own informed independent decision.").
14 Although this ideal vision may never have been perfectly followed, even on
Learned Hand's court, that court did come quite close to the ideal. The closest student of
Learned Hand's court reported that as late as 1960, oral argument was heard in practically
every case, "a small number of appeals" were decided from the bench following argument,
and about 20% of the appeals were decided in brief per curiam decisions. MARVIN ScHcI,
LEARNED HAND'S COURT 9,-94 (1970). The court's famous "pre-conference" memo practice insured the familiarity of each panel member with the case. Id. at 98. As for the
influence of law clerks, Judge Medina is supposed to have said that Learned Hand
"wouldn't even let a law clerk write a sentence, not one sentence." Harold R. Medina, The
Decisional Process in the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit-How the
Wheels Go Around Inside-with Commentary, Address at the New York County Lawyers
Association Forum Evening (Apr. 26, 1962), quoted in ScHICK, supra at 107 n.92. Analogously, United States DistrictJudge Prentice Marshall, speaking of his clerkship withJudge
Walter C. Lindley of the Seventh Circuit, stated:
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Today, the courts use the traditional method in less than half of
their cases. For the remainder of the docket, they forgo the traditional process in an effort to conserve time and cope with the caseload
crisis. The courts employ a variety of methods to reduce judge time.
The most frequently used methods are the limitation of oral argument, reduction of the length, quality, and number of written opinions, and expansion of the role of visiting and senior judges and nonjudicial staff.15
A.

Oral Argument: Deciding Without Hearing

Perhaps the most visible change in appellate procedure has involved oral argument. At one time, argument in a single case could
last several days. The rise of extended briefing and formal record extracts made such lengthy oral argument redundant, and argument was
thus limited 16 and made more routine. Nonetheless, a half hour per
17
side was still available in most cases.
Today, however, fewer than half of the Courts of Appeals hear
oral argument in at least half of the cases they decide. 18 The trend
toward less argument is steep; the percentage of appeals argued has
fallen from 56% in 1985 to 45% in 1992.19 There is great disparity
among the circuits as to the availability of oral argument; a pattern,
however, is discernable.20 A safe generalization is that the courts hear
argument more frequently in cases involving high-profile matters,
We worked on only a fraction of the assigned cases. During my time with
him, he wrote sixty-four opinions and three dissents, plus a significant
number of opinions for the then Emergency Court of Appeals. He worked
at no more than half of his capacity. And the cases in those days were not
simple diversity based personal injury cases. They embraced the full spectrum: antitrust, securities fraud, commodities markets, class actions, major
criminal prosecutions, patents, trademarks and copyrights (he devoured
patent cases), and yes, even habeas c0rpus.
Prentice H. Marshall, Some Reflections on the Quality of Life of a United States DistrictJudge, 27
ARiz. L. Ray. 593, 594 (1985).

15 Complaints about lack of oral argument, unpublished opinions, and "one-judge"
opinions go back many decades. See, e.g., Paxton Blair, FederalAppellate Procedure as Affected
by the Act ofFebruaqy 13, 1925, 25 COLuM. L. Ray. 393, 397 (1925). There can be no doubt,

however, that American judges, lawyers, and professors have a "Platonic" concept of the
appellate process. It is that concept which has been left behind as judges have sought to
cope with the caseload increase without markedly expanding the size of the federal
judiciary.

16 Extended argument was necessary in a time when formal briefs were rare and the
appeal proceeded on a bare-bones record. CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND,

A HisroRy 81 (1928).

"[I]n 1950 an oral argument and a written opinion were afforded in all federal
appeals as a right." BAKER, supranote 13, at 47.
18 Id. at 110.
19 MCKENNA, supra note 3, at 43. One ironic result is that appellants in federal circuit
courts who have a statutory right to appeal receive less oral argument than they do in some
states where there is no right to appeal.
20 See BAKER, supra note 13, at 115; MCKENNA, supra note 3, at 43.
17

280
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such as securities and antitrust cases, than in social security or veterans' appeals; courts rarely, if ever, grant oral argument in pro se
cases.2 1 Finally, even when oral arguments are allowed, they are abbreviated: several courts routinely give only fifteen minutes of argu22
ment per side.
Because argument can be very valuable, its absence affects the
quality of decision making. The Supreme Court, for example, hears
argument in virtually all cases in which it grants certiorari. Not surprisingly, in a recent survey, seven of eight federal circuit judges
found oral argument "very helpful" or "often helpful."23 Justice Brennan, Professor Llewellyn, and many others have also spoken of the
value of argument.2 4 Kenneth Starr, former circuit judge and Solicitor General, observed that, "in the age of overcrowded dockets, the
importance of oral argument will, ironically, be enhanced."25 Chief
26
Justice Hughes once wrote, "The one who decides must hear." It is
easy to see the relation between argument and quality. Oral argument brings the judges together and involves them in the case 27 both
mentally and physically-a process which helps the quality of decision
making.2 8 Argument permits judges to ask questions the briefs do not
answer and to explore alternative theories that the parties have not
developed.2 9 The marked decrease in argument, therefore, necessarily reduces the quality of decision making.
Unfortunately for many litigants, argument is most useful in
those cases least likely to receive it, e.g., those in which the briefing is
pro se, bad, or non-existent. Neither the judge nor the staff in those
cases will receive useful input about the case from the appellant;3 0 in
contrast, the appellee, usually a government agency, will be able to
place its side of the case before the court. Not surprisingly, cases not
argued are "affirmed at a greater rate than cases in which argument
21 See Lauren K Robel, Caseload and judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REv. 3, 48.
22 Id. The suggested norm in the Appellate Rules is thirty minutes, but additional
time may be made available upon request. FED. R. App. P. 34, advisory committee's note.
23 Robel, supra note 21, at 54.
24
See Charles R.Haworth, Screening and Summary Proceduresin the United States Courts of
Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 257, 317.
25 Kenneth W. Starr, The Courts of Appeals and the Future of the FederalJudiciary, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 1, 6.

26

Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).

27

JOE S. CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMI-

NATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS 159-60 (1987).

28 See Robel, supra note 21, at 49. See also Stephen L. Wasby, The Functions and Importance of Appellate Oral Argument: Some Views of Lawyers and FederaIJudges,65JUDICATURE 340
(1982) (emphasizing the value of oral argument in helping judges focus on the case and in
communicating with both other judges and lawyers).
29 Reinhardt, Surveys, supra note 2, at 1510.
30 Robel, supra note 21, at 56.
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occurs," and "cases not argued are much less likely to be decided with
a published opinion."3 ' It also is not surprising that oral argument is
much more likely to be heard in securities and antitrust cases than it is
in veterans' benefit and prisoner petition cases. In short, less interesting cases are less likely to be argued and, therefore, less likely to benefit from the focus and communication that is a part of oral argument.
This is unfortunate; both quality and justice suffer. Even in easy cases,
"[b]y ensuring that each party has an opportunity to argue his case
before the court, oral argument encourages litigants to believe that
they are receiving a fair shake from the appellate courts and serves to
32
maintain confidence in our legal system."
Equally disturbing is the process the courts use to determine
whether to hear argument. The stated rule is clear enough: Oral argument is heard "in all cases unless pursuant to local rule a panel of
three judges.., shall be unanimously of the opinion that oral argument is not needed."33 Unfortunately, the apparently strong de jure
presumption in favor of argument amounts in fact to a de facto presumption againstargument.3 4 Indeed, lawyers frequently have to persuade courts to grant argument. Thus, a typical local rule, that of the
Fourth Circuit, requires counsel to append to the brief a statement
explaining why argument is desirable. 35 Obtaining oral argument,
therefore, really amounts to a petitioning process, and litigants who
can afford expert advocates get the lion's share of the scarce judicial
resources available. Further, although the petition is addressed to the
judges, in many cases it will be reviewed initially by central staff who
will recommend whether argument should be heard. 36 Thus, "the
process of determining which litigants will receive oral argument is
37
beyond the reach of the adversary process, if not entirely invisible."
B.

Limited Publication: Deciding Without Writing

The court's tangible work product also has changed dramatically
in recent years. "Published opinions," Judge Jones wrote recently,
"were once the hallmark of the appellate courts' work."38 The traditional expectation was that an appellate decision would be expressed
Id. at 48.
32 Reinhardt, Surveys, supranote 2, at 1510. See also Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization
of the Judiiaqy, 92 YA . L.J. 1442, 1484 (1983) ("Oral argument places the decisionmaker
face-to-face with the contestants and gives what is often a remote and abstract legal system
an important human character.").
33 FED. R. App. P. 34(a).
34 See BAKER, supranote 13, at 108-09 (discussing Rule 34 and concluding that it is "an
empty set of words").
35 4TH CmR. R. 34.1.
36 McKm"A, supra note 3, at 50.
37 1d. at 45.
38 Jones, supra note 1, at 1492.
31
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in a written and fully reasoned opinion, and that the opinion would
be published and added to the stock of precedent.3 9 That expectation
no longer exists. Rather, each circuit has a local rule identifying those
opinions that it will publish.40 Although the actual criteria differ
among the circuits, the publication decision is based on the assumption that opinions which do not "make law" do not need formal publication; as a corollary, unpublished opinions are said to lack
"precedential value" and usually cannot be cited as precedent. Given
this underlying assumption, it is hardly surprising that published opinions today account for less than a third of federal circuit
4
terminations. '
The decline in publication is unfortunate because the traditional,
fully reasoned written opinion 42 serves a number of vital functions. 43
For instance, a published opinion enhances predictability. Even if the
opinion does no more than restate existing legal doctrine, it can show
how the doctrine applies to different facts. Publication thus increases
certainty by increasing the stock of precedents. 4 4 Publication also
hardens precedents because it is easier for a court to ignore one in45
convenient precedent than ten.

Publication also serves to hold judges accountable for their opinions. 46 Accountability encourages well-reasoned decisions. When a
judge makes no attempt to provide a satisfactory explanation of the
39 A published opinion is the "working tool of lawyers and the building block of
judges." John Reid, Doe Did Not Sit-The Creation of Opinions by an Artist, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
59, 59 (1963).
40 Efforts to limit publication by the circuit courts can be traced back to the late
1940s. See, e.g., Francis P. Whitehair, Opinions of Courts: Fifth Circuit Acts Against Unneeded
Publication, 33 A.BAJ.751 (1947). See generally William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-PrecedentialPrecedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM L REv. 1167 (1978) (discussing the history of limited
publication).
41

McKENNA, supranote 3, at 47.

42 Professor Meador has suggested that there should be more oral opinions, delivered
at the close of arguments and conducted without time limits. Daniel J. Meador, Toward
Civility and Visibility in theAppellate Process, 42 MD. L. REv. 732 (1983). An oral opinion need
not lack quality simply because it is oral; it could be as well thought out as a written opinion. Because of its evanescent quality, however, an oral opinion will not enhance judicial
accountability.
43 For a somewhat contrary view of limited publication, see RobertJ. Martineau, Restrictions on Publicationand CitationofJudicialOpinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MicH.J.L. Rr.
119 (1994).
44
See RicHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: Ciusis & RFxoRM 122 (1985) ("[T]he
real significance of an unpublished opinion is that it is not citable as precedent.").
45 See, e.g., id. at 129 (arguing that "stare decisis has a lot more weight than some 'legal
realists' think").
46
See MarthaJ. Dragich, Wll the FederalCourts of Appeals PerishIf They Publish? OrDoes
the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain andJustify JudicialDecisionsPose a GreaterThreat?, 44
Am.U. L. Rxv. 757, 781 (1995) (Opinion writing "sharpen [s] analysis, and... impos[es] a
sense of responsibility and discipline on judges").
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result, neither the actual litigants nor subsequent readers of an opinion can know whether the judge paid careful attention to the case and
decided the appeal according to the law or whether the judge relied
on impermissible factors such as race, sex, political influence, or
merely the flip of a coin. Perhaps few losing litigants will be persuaded by a carefully reasoned explanation, but that explanation will
often reveal whether the judge treated the case seriously.47 Moreover,
full publication helps to insure thatjudicial opinions are readily accessible, certainly a necessary condition for the realistic evaluation of
either a judge or a court.
Similarly, the signed opinion assigns responsibility. The author
of a bad opinion cannot hide behind the shield of anonymity; blame,
or praise-worthiness, is there for all to see. "By signing his name to a
judgment or opinion the judge assures the parties that he has thoroughly participated in that process and assumes individual responsibility for the decision."48 In contrast, the unpublished opinion (or
order) rarely has an author other than that noted Norwegian jurist,
"PerCuiam."49 In per cutiam decisions, blame or praise is spread out
among three judges with the pernicious consequence of diffusing the
judges' responsibility and accountability. Judges who cannot be held
individually responsible either for the reasoning or the result have far
less incentive to insure that they "get it right." More accurately, given
the increasing reliance on staff to prepare opinions, the anonymous
judge has far less incentive to see that they get it right.
Non-publication also diminishes the possibility of additional review. For all practical purposes, the courts of appeals are the courts of
last resort in the federal system; fewer than one percent of their decisions receive plenary review by the Supreme Court. The limited appellate capacity of the Supreme Court makes it extremely unlikely that
it will review an unpublished opinion. After all, a cogent explanation
also makes it possible for a reviewing court to understand the case. 50
Without that explanation, the likelihood of discretionary review by an
en bane court or by the Supreme Court decreases to the vanishing
point.5 1 Moreover, a reviewing court is far less likely to spend its own
Or at least that her staff 'did.
Fiss, supra'note 32, at 1443.
49
In this respect, the unpublished opinion resembles those of many European appellate courts. LOUISJAFFEE, THE ORACLES OF THE LAw 406 (1968) (French courts speak with
"single voice").
50
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides a useful analog here. Rule 52(a) is designed to provide a district court opinion with enough information to permit intelligent review by the
circuit court. Far too many opinions of those courts, however, fail to meet the standards
that they impose on lower courts.
51 These types of review include not only a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court,
but also rehearings by the original panel and rehearings en bane. The Supreme Court can
be quite caustic when it does review an unpublished opinion. See, e.g., United States v.
47
48
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resources on a case already determined to be without precedential
value. Although review is very unlikely anyway, a litigant should not
have the chances of review further reduced merely because a panel
did not think the case worthy of an opinion.
The costs of non-publication are not limited to reduced predictability, accountability, responsibility, and reviewability. It should
come as no surprise that unpublished dispositions are also dreadful in
quality. In a study conducted fifteen years ago, we found that twenty
percent of unpublished opinions in nine of the eleven circuits failed
to satisfy a very undemanding definition of minimum standards, and
that sixty percent of the opinions in three circuits failed to meet those
standards. 52 There is no reason to think that the situation has improved in the years since. It is no wonder, therefore, that former
Chief Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit once told his Circuit Conference that unpublished decisions were "junk" opinions.53 One cannot help but ask, however, whether the losing litigants thought of
their claims as 'Junk," or whether the definition of "junk"has changed
54
over the years.
It is not difficult to understand why unpublished opinions are
dreadful in quality. The primary cause lies in the absence of accountability and responsibility; their absence breeds sloth and indifference.
Moreover, ajudge's mastery of the case is reduced when she does not
publish. Every author knows that views often change as she actually
begins to write and seek support for what she has to say. Writing out
an opinion helps the author to understand the problem, to see things
55
she otherwise would not see.

Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2702 n.3 (1993) (We deem it "remarkable and unusual
that although the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of
Congress was unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its
judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion.").
52 William L.Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in
the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CH. L.Rv. 573 tbl. at 602
(1981). An opinion satisfied the "minimum standards inquiry" if it gave some indication of
what the case was about and some reason for the result. Id at 601.
53 ChiefJudge Howard T. Markey, Remarks at the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (May 24, 1989), in 128
F.R.D. 409, 414 (1989).
54 A dozen years ago Judge Edwards observed that the circuit courts were deciding a
significant number of cases without opinion even though two decades before those cases
would surely have led to published opinions. Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and
Perceived "Bureaucracy"of the FederalCourts: A Causation-BasedApproach to the SearchforAppropriateRemedies, 68 IowA L. Ray. 871, 895 (1983). Judge Wald recently agreed: "Due to the
pressure of accelerating caseloads, the majority of federal cases now get this unpublished
treatment. Many would have been the subject of full-fledged opinions a few decades ago."
Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: JudicialWritings, 62 U. CHI.
L. Rv.1371, 1373 (1995).
55 On Learned Hand's court, each judge on the panel prepared a pre-conference
memo following oral argument. In that memo, "each judge individually worked through
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However poor the quality of unpublished opinions, they are
Cardozoesque in comparison to the practice of issuing mere "Orders"-dispositions that contain no explanation at all.5 6 Orders fail
any quality test Their proffered justification is that it is unnecessary
"to explain even to the loser, why he lost."57 That statement is deadwrong, even for the most frivolous cases. Explanation is fundamental
to our system of justice. 58 Its absence in the one-word Orders effectively converts the statutory appeal of right into a denial of a petition
for certiorari; in both cases the decision maker has declined to explain its decision. The difference, of course, is that the Supreme
Court has been given statutory discretion to deny certiorari without
explanation, while the circuit courts are under a statutory duty to hear
every appeal.5 9
A final cost of non-publication stems from the problem of unequal access. The circuit courts limit public access to their unpublished opinions by restricting their distribution 60 and prohibiting
their citation as precedent. 61 These no-citation rules were designed to
off-set the advantages of well-financed and institutional litigants who
might possess private data banks of unpublished opinions. 62 That
the case and reached tentative conclusions before ever consulting with his colleagues."
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THEJUDGE 287 (1994). The memos led
to "a far greater familiarity with the facts and legal issues." Id. The memos also saved
judicial time because they "obliged the judges to articulate their reasoning and, as a result,
the time needed to confer was often shorter than it otherwise would have been." Id. at 288.
56 For example, Rule 36 of the Federal Circuit permits one-word dispositions. In FY
1995, the court used Rule 36 to dispose of 29% of its merit-based terminations. Letter
from Francis X. Grindhart Clerk of the Federal Circuit (May15, 1996).
57 Markey, supra note 53, at 420. Unfortunately, Judge Markey did not tell his audience why it was not necessary to explain.
58 "In our law... the exercise of a power to speak authoritatively as an interpreter
carries with it an obligation to explain the grounds upon which the interpreter gives the
authoritative judgment." Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation
of FederalStatutes, 32 WNM.
& MARY L. REv. 827, 838 (1991). Compare Judge Markey's position with Judge Rubin's comment: "Everyjudge should be required to give his reasons for
a decision, and those reasons should be sufficient to explain the result to the litigants but
also to enable other litigants to comprehend its precedential value and limits to its authority." Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratizationof the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and
Efficiency, 55 NoTRE DAME LAW. 648, 655 (1980).
59 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) provides: "The courts of appeals.., shall havejurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States."
60
Generally, unreported opinions are distributed only to the parties and the judge
below. Robel, supra note 21, at 51 n.195. "Unpublished" opinions, however, frequently

can be found on computer data bases and in specialized reporters, and are, therefore,
readily accessible.
61 Only two circuits do not prohibit the use of unpublished opinions as precedent.
62 Reynolds & Richman, supra note 52, at 581-83. A useful comparison can be made
with official French case reports, which, because they are brief and stylized, cannot be
understood without the generally unpublished conclusionsand rapports. See generaly Mitchel
de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self)-Portraits: JudicialDiscourse in the FrenchLegal System, 104
YALE L. 1325, 1357-69 (1995) (discussing the unpublished opinions of French courts).
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hope has not been realized. Even though they cannot cite unpublished opinions, repeat litigants (the federal government is an example), are able to catalog them and use their arguments. They also may
request formal publication of those unpublished opinions that they
believe will make favorable precedent 63 In other words, such repeat
litigants have been able to skew the precedent-setting function by obtaining publication of a favorable set of unpublished opinions. 64 The
negative effects of these practices, once again, bear most heavily upon
the poor and the weak. Once again, the losers are prisoner civil-rights
litigants, disappointed social security claimants, and other underrepresented litigants lacking both the resources to amass and catalog
unpublished opinions and the clout and incentive to ask for publica65
tion of favorable precedents.
C.

Additional Decision Makers: Deciding By Bureaucracy

Another strategy for dealing with the expanded caseload is to increase the number of decision makers. Although the judiciary has resisted efforts to expand the numbers of circuit judgeships, 66 courts
have been much less reluctant to expand the number of personnel
involved in the decision making process. Those persons are of two
types: judges who belong to other courts and parajudicial personnel.
Robel, supra note 21, at 51-52.
64 Ironically, this disruption of traditional appellate procedure may actually do little
to ease the caseload crisis, even though non-publication of an opinion probably saves judicial time. Indeed, we found in an earlier study that scant correlation existed between publication rates and circuit productivity. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 52, at 596-97 & tbl.
7. That study did find, however, that unpublished opinions were both shorter and decided
more rapidly than their published counterparts. Me.at 594, 598. Although productivity was
not noticeably enhanced, less work was needed to crank out the decision. We do not know
what the judges did with their extra time. But see Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody,
The Effectiveness of Measures to Increase Appellate Court Efficieng and Decision Outpu 21 U.
MICH. J. L. RE". 415, 438 (1988) (analyzing state appellate procedures).
There is widespread belief at the bar that judges sometimes use the non-publication
route to reach decisions that cannot be squared with controlling authority. This belief
could have perverse caseload consequences. If true, or even if widely believed by the bar to
be true, that use of unpublished opinions actually increases the number of appeals. An
attorney may take an appeal that she otherwise would not take in the hope that the court
will recognize the justice of her client's position and reverse the judgment in an unpublished opinion-one that contains little reasoning and no precedential value. Professor
Robel writes, for example, that an attorney "might assess differently" the wisdom of appealing an immigration decision "if he knew that the Ninth Circuit published only 27% of its
immigration opinions in [1987], and that over half of the reversals of [agency] decisions
occurred in unpublished decisions." Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion:
Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MIcH.
L. REv. 940, 947 (1989). In short, limited publication may increase, rather than reduce,
both judicial workload and doctrinal incoherence.
65
Data on the types of cases for which opinions are not published can be found in
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 52, at 622; Robel, supra note 21, at 65.
66
See infra part III.
63
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VuitingJudges

The days when a panel was made up of three active circuit judges
are long gone. Today, "panels often include only one active circuit
judge; some include none."67 The gap has been filled with visiting
firefighters: seniorjudges, visiting judges from other circuits, and districtjudges. The impact of these visitors is rarely commented upon,
but it can be dramatic: In 1991, for example, 12% of appellate judge
time was provided by resident senior judges and 7% by visiting
judges. 68 In at least one circuit, the percentage of participation in
terminations by active judges was only 71.7.69 Although no data are
available on the use of district judges, a glance through the Federal
Reporter reveals that they sit quite frequently on the circuit courts.
The use of resident senior circuit judges is close to unobjectionable under any standard. They are wise in the folkways of the circuit
and should not disrupt the court's normal workings. 70 Visitingjudges,
district or circuit, are a different story. One study found that Eighth
Circuit judges "noted more disadvantages than advantages from districtjudge participation." 7 ' Two problems deserve special mention.
First, resident circuit judges expressed reluctance to let trial judges
shape the development of the law.72 Second, visiting circuit judges
may disturb collegial ways by their disregard for the host circuit's individual practices, and by their ignorance of, or disdain for, circuit
precedent.7 3
4

2. Parajudges-"Ghostwriters'The most startling development in appellate courts in the past
quarter-century has been the very marked increase in the role played
by non-judicial personnel, or "parajudges." The number of ajudge's
personal clerks has grown from one to three.7 5 Far more significant,
however, has been the exponential growth in the numbers and role of
McKenna, supra note 3, at 38.
Id.
69
Id. at 58-39 (15% by senior judges; 13.3% by visiting judges).
But see Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appealsfor
70
the Seventh Circui, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 720 (1994) [hereinafter Chicago Report] (suggesting that the chiefjudge should be more careful in certifying the continued eligibility of
senior circuit judges to sit on panels).
71
Stephen L. Wasby, Internal Communication in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 58
WASH. U. L.Q. 583, 598 (1980). For a discussion of the pros and cons of trial judge particiat 597-600.
pation in the courts of appeals, see id.
72
Id. at 598.
73 See SCHICI, supranote 14, at 80.
74 Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (and Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHi. L.REv.
1421, 1423-24 (1995).
75 Some judges substitute a fourth clerk for the second secretary they are permitted.
McKENNA, supra note 3, at 52 n.96. There are often student interns in chambers as well.
67

68
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central staff-a group unheard of three decades ago. This growth is
the direct result of caseload pressures: "[T] he caseload per judge has
risen to the point where very few judges, however able and dedicated,
can keep up with the flow without heavy reliance on law clerks, staff
attorneys, and sometimes externs too." 76 The judicial system pays a
significant price for that delegation, however, because inappropriate
delegation of quintessentially judicial tasks has become the norm.
a. Personal Clerks
It is widely assumed in the legal world that law clerks draft most
opinions. There may be some debate about how widespread the phenomenon is, but there is agreement that it occurs to a significant extent with a large number ofjudges. 7 7 This development raises many
serious concerns.
Ideally, ajudge would write all of her own opinions. 78 The public
advantages of her doing so are clear: Only by going through the record herself can any judge be sure that she, not just her clerks, has
mastered the facts of the case; and only by writing the opinion herself
can she be sure that the facts play out properly against the reasoning
leading to the decision. 79 Lawyers know all too well that some things
'Just won't write," and there is certainly plenty ofjudicial commentary
to the same effect.8 0 The judge struggling "to get it right" herself is a
76

Posner, supra note 44, at 103.

77

See, e.g., id. at 103-04. The classic comment on clerks comes from Judge Rubin:

"What are these able, intelligent, mostly young people doing? Surely not
merely running citations in Shepard's and shelving the judge's law books.
They are in many situations 'parajudges.' In some instances, it is to be
feared, they are indeed invisible judges, for there are appellate judges
whose literary style appears to change annually."
Alvin B. Rubin, Views From the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REv.448, 456 (1976). Even Judge
Edwards, a staunch defender of the clerks' role, recognizes that the growth in their numbers has stemmed from the growth in caseload. Harry T. Edwards, Ajudge's Vew on Justice,
Bureaucracy and Legal Method, 80 MIcH. L. REv. 259, 262 (1981).
78 We hope that this is self-evident. No matter how smart, hard-working, and wise a
clerk may be, and no matter how dumb, lazy, or lacking in goodjudgment ajudge may be,
the final responsibility for a decision lies with the judge. It is the judge, not the clerks,
whom the President nominates and the Senate confirms; it is therefore the judge, not the
clerk, who should be making the fully informed decision.
79 This is not to deny personal clerks a role in the process. Even in an ideal world
clerks serve a useful role apart from proofreading or source-checking. The clerk is a
sounding board for the judge's views and is a useful check on judicial logic and wisdom.
80 See, e.g., Wald, supra note 54, at 1375; POSNER, supra note 44, at 111:
It is not just a failure of imagination, I think, that makes me unable to
visualize Oliver Wendell Holmes coordinating a team of law clerks and secretaries and polishing the drafts that the clerks submitted to him. The sense
of style that is inseparable from the idea of a greatjudge in our tradition is
unlikely to develop in a judge who does not do his own writing.
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far cry from the judge editing what her law clerk has written.8 ' As
Judge Frank wrote half a century ago:
It is sometimes said that the requirement that the trial judge file
findings of fact is for the convenience of the upper courts. While it
does serve that end, it has a far more important purpose-that of
evoking care on the part of the trial judge in ascertaining the facts.
For, as every judge knows, to set down in precise words the facts as
he finds them is the best way to avoid carelessness in the discharge
of that duty: Often a strong impression that... the facts are thusand-so gives way when it comes to expressing that impression on
82
paper.
When a judge had one or perhaps even two personal clerks, the
intimacy of the relationship may well have enhanced the judge's own
decision making capabilities; two minds worked as one.83 The increasing size and bureaucracy of judicial staffs, however, have diminished
that traditional relationship: "The short stint by the bright, young,
just-graduated law student, who moved into an intimate relationship
with an old Justice, kept him fresh, and then moved almost immediately on into his own life and career, has already begun to be replaced
by a job description and a job."8 4 The judge/clerk relationship, in
short, has become less personal, and more bureaucratic.
The result of more clerks, therefore, is diminished quality in both
decision making and opinion writing in those cases (apparently a
large majority), in which clerks do a substantial part of the writing and
the judge does the editing.8 5 Because law clerk influence is likely to
be the greatest in less important cases, which are not argued and will
not be published, diminished quality, once again, will be most prevalent there.

A useful comparison can be drawn with the requirement in FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)
that, in non-jury trials, "the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon." Appellate courts take this requirement seriously and are quite
hostile to judicial adoption of findings and conclusions submitted by counsel. E.g., Roberts
v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1965). This hostility is due to the fact that "[t]he formulation of the findings and conclusions is part of the decision making process." JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL, Ex AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 542 (2d ed. 1994).
82
United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 694
(1942).
83 A glowing account of the judge/clerk relationship can be found in Patricia M.
Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REv. 152 (1990).
84 Joseph Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REv. 248, 251-52
(1981).
85 Judge Posner has identified other costs in the significant use of law clerks in opinion writing, including a loss of credibility and the demise of the greatjudge. See POSNER,
supra note 44, at 108-11.
81
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Central Staff

Ironically, the most dramatic change in the circuit courts has also
received the least attention from outside observers. Twenty-five years
ago there were no central staff attorneys in the federal courts; now
most circuits have more central staff than judges. That growth, which
Judge McCree years ago called "cancerous,"8 6 has occurred despite
serious efforts to prevent it.87 Little is known about how central staff
actually work today.8 8 Staff duties vary widely among the circuits, but
typically staff members screen cases for oral argument, decide motions, and write opinions in cases decided without oral argument. We
do not know, however, who hires staff, what their qualifications are,
how they are supervised, or how long they stay on the job.89 Nor do
we know why staff are added. 90 No formal procedures spell out their
exact duties, which apparently vary significantly among the circuits.
Although Congress, in response to concern about staff, has required
the circuits to publish their "operating procedures," 9 ' the results have
been quite vague. 92 The Federal Judicial Center prediction that "litigants and counsel in an appeal decided without argument seldom
[will] know what role, if any, a staff attorney played in the handling of
their appeal[,]" 9 3 surely will remain accurate for a long time to
come.9 4 No wonder, in the words of an elite ABA committee, practitioners "may believe, sometimes correctly, that cases are decided effectively by someone other than an Article III judge."95
86

Wade H. McCree, Jr., BureaucraticJustice:An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 777,

787 (1981).
87 See McKENNA, supranote 3, at 50-51, for details concerning those efforts. The most
serious attempt at stopping the growth of central staff was to limit the number of staff to
the number of authorized judgeships; that effort failed. BAKER, supra note 13, at 146 n.173.
88

But see DONNA STIENSTRA & JOE S. CECIL, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE ROLE OF

STAFF ATToRNEmS AND FACE-TO-FACE CONFERENCING IN NON-ARGUMENT DECISIONMAKING"

(1989) (detailing the role of staff attorneys in the Tenth Circuit).
89 The length of a staffer's service is critical. While experience may be very valuable
to the staffer's performance, it also creates the strong temptation for the staffer to view
himself as an expert decision maker.
90 The Ninth Circuit has recently added the first federal "Appellate Commissioner."
See Reinhardt, supra note 1, at 1512 n.28. See also Lauren Frank, Ninth Circuit Appellate
CommissionerAssists Judges, 78 JUDICATURE 321 (1995).
91 28 U.S.C. § 2077(a) (1994).
92 See McKENNA, supra note 8, at 51-52.
93 Id. at 51-52.

94

The ABA Report recommended "[f] ormalizing the role of court personnel in such

decisions.., to reduce the misapprehensions of parties and counsel about the extent of

their power." ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 549.
95 ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 548. One prominent attorney has commented that
he and his colleagues "regard screening as a device to push the lawyer out of the law
entirely. We just don't count anymore." John P. Frank, Remarks at the Conference on
Empirical Research inJudicial Administration (Mar. 4 & 5, 1988), in 21 Aiuz. ST. LJ. 33,
126 (1989).
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There is a delicious irony here. Federal magistrates, a superbly
qualified group, must issue a written report disposing of cases assigned by the district court. If a litigant objects to that report, the
district court must review the magistrate's report de novo. Moreover, it
is grounds for reversal if the district judge simply adopts the magistrate's opinion, as opposed to writing his own. 9 6 Congress and the

appellate courts, in other words, have adopted procedures to assure
effective supervision of the work of the magistrates. In contrast, no
rule requires any notice to the parties or judicial revision of the drafts
suggested by staff. In short, the circuit courts, not surprisingly, are
more demanding of the trial courts than they are of themselves.
The cumulative impact of the growth of law clerks and central
staff increases the likelihood that ajudge will evaluate cases on a second-hand basis. This growth helps process cases, of course, but it also
reduces judicial involvement with the raw material of the case-e.g.,
the briefs, the record, the precedents, and even the counsel. The
judge has become a bureaucrat. 97 Of course, no one knows the exact
amount of deference given to the work of staff clerks, and deference
no doubt varies depending on the clerk, the judge, the court, and the
type of case.9 8 Nonetheless, the rampant growth of staff clerks
strongly suggests that judges believe staff to be useful, and it is very
difficult to believe that utility is limited to translating the handwriting
on prisoner petitions and working on procedural motions. Clearly,
the staff are assisting the court in processing its caseload, a point
made by Justices Rehnquist, Breyer, and many others. 99
Finally, a belief that staff, notjudges, are playing a decisive role in
decision making and opinion writing undermines the legitimacy of
96 E.g., Hernandez v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1983) (remanding case because of
district court's improper reliance on magistrate's report and failure to make independent
determination of contested findings).

97 Judge Rubin, after speaking of delegation to staff and clerks fifteen years ago, observed, "I fear we are approaching a kind of institutional judging in our courts." Rubin,

supra note 58, at 642.

98 SeeJones, supra note 1, at 1492 (stating that staff attorneys "often ... prepar[el
memoranda that can readily be transformed into.., opinions").
99 See supra text accompanying notes 7-8. See also ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 549.
More than a decade ago, both Judge Edwards and Judge Posner separately wrote that an
increase in judicial staff would be counter-productive. POSNER, supra note 44, at 119. Edwards, supra note 54, at 889-90. Nevertheless, the number of staff continues to grow. Overdelegation of judicial duties is a serious concern expressed both by academics and the

judges themselves. See, e.g., Mary Lou Stow &HaroldJ. Spaeth, CentralizedResearch Staff. Is
There a Monster in theJudicial Closet?, 75 JUDIcATURE 216 (1992). For a discussion of the
bureaucratic effects of central staff, see Fiss, supra note 32, at 1456.
A Federal Judicial Center survey found that 28% ofjudges thought that "over delegation" was a large or grave problem. In contrast, 40% believed there was only "a small
problem or [no] problem at all." McKENNA, supra note 3, at 49. Judges are evenly divided
over whether to add more staff. Id. at 52.
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the court's decision making process.' 0 0 Lawyers, litigants, and even
lower court judges can find little comfort in a decision which they
believe has been made by the staff. This loss of legitimacy is all the
more acute because the effect of staff participation is felt most keenly
in cases brought by the poor-the group most in need of the services
of the federal judiciary.
D.

Other Shortcuts-Warping Doctrine

Another way to cope with the burgeoning caseload is to propound decisional rules that either discourage litigation, particularly at
the appellate level, or make the cases easier to resolve. Although it is
difficult to prove that a heavy caseload inspires a particular legal rule,
there are certainly many potential candidates. For example, Judge
King of the Fifth Circuit has suggested that in at least one of her
court's decisions, "the paring down of prisoner petitions was at work
in the developing of our rule, even though other factors were also
strongly operative." 10 Anyone who follows the federal courts has
10 2
other candidates for the same observation.
Perhaps less obvious, the increasing emphasis in the courts on
the use of strict housekeeping rules as gatekeepers is also attributable,
in part, to an effort to reduce caseload. Indeed, some believe that the
appellate courts have become nit-pickers, overly concerned with enforcing rules governing the minutiae of practice. 0 3 Thus, a massive
study of the Seventh Circuit identified
100 An anecdote neatly sums up the role now played by staff. In the Tenth Circuit,
where the judges are scattered across vast areas, it was once the practice for central staffers
working on a case to travel to the city where the presiding judge sat to meet with him on
the case. Now, however, the judges travel to circuit headquarters in Denver, where staff is
located. See SIENSTRA & CECIL, supra note 88, at 53-57. It may save money for the mountain
to go to Mohammed, but the symbolism of the reverse trip certainly is disturbing.
101 King, supranote 7, at 963 (discussing Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir.
1990), rev'd 503 U.S. 1 (1992)).
102 It is easy to speculate about other examples. Professor Fisch, for example, has expressed surprise at the fondness the federal circuit courts have shown for the use of vacatur. She found this puzzling in light of the perverse effect of vacatur on caseload-i.e., it
will increase the workload of the district courts. SeeJill E. Fisch, The Vanishing Precedent:
Eduardo Meets Vacatur, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 325, 336-38 (1994). The paradox resolves
itself when it is realized that vacatur reduces the work of the appellatecourts.
Similarly, the Chicago Report, supra note 70, at 797, suggested that the views of a
Seventh Circuitjudge on the overwork crisis in federal courts "may influence his rulings in
certain cases."
103 See, e.g., Chicago Report, supranote 70, at 696, 703-05 (discussing restrictive limits
on the number of pages a brief may contain). See also Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil
Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BRooK. L. R-v. 1155, 1167 (1993) (discussing
changes in federal rules in response to allegations of excessive "litigiousness and frivolousness ... [even though] the facts probably belie the allegations"). More generally, the
federal courts have seen a marked increase in both managerial judging and alternative
dispute resolution, a development that has created "a declining interest in fact finding."
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a frequently heard complaint: that the court is too concerned with
the demands of managing its own business and not aware enough
of, or concerned about, the real needs of lawyers and parties in litigating cases. In the Council's view, the court does not consider liti04
gants to be its customers.'
Similarly, Professor Wright has attributed the "remarkable new enthusiasm [for] preclusion" to docket pressures. 0 5
II
THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE SHORTCUTS

The cumulative impact of decision making shortcuts has imposed
costs above and beyond the disadvantages of each individual procedure. As a result of the reforms, the circuit courts have lost their role
as appellate courts and have become certiorari courts. Further, the
changes in the decision making process have diminished the quality
of the courts' work, a degradation which has had the greatest effect
upon the poorest and least powerful litigants.
A.

The New Certiorari Courts

Although Congress has given all losing litigants a statutory right
to "appeal," 0 6 decisional shortcuts have had the practical effect of
transforming the courts of appeals into certiorari courts. The right to
appeal is now only nominal. 0 7 Expressed somewhat differently, the
circuit judges are minimizing their historic role as error correctors
and emphasizing their role as law makers.' 0 8 They are becoming, in
the words of Dean Carrington, "junior Supreme Courts." 0 9 The characteristics of a certiorari court are well known. It chooses its own
docket and typically gives no explanation why it has denied plenary
review. Further, denials of plenary review lack precedential effect.
Now consider the federal appellate process today. The "appellant's"
brief must persuade the staff to recommend argument to the panel.
Moreover, even if argument is heard, it is still possible that the case
will be disposed of by a one-word opinion (e.g., "affirmed") which explains nothing to the parties. Washed in the realist's "cynical acid,"
Judith Resnik, Civil Litigation in The TwentyFirst Century: A PanelDiscussion, 59 BROOK. L
REV. 1199, 1214 (1993).
104 Chicago Report, supra note 70,
105 Charles Alan Wright, Overview:

at 696.
The FederalCourt System-1886, 1986, and 2086, 38

S.C. L. REv. 381, 387 (1987).
106
107

28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
See Donald P. Lay, A ProposalforDiscretionaiyReview inFederalCourts of Appeals 34 Sw.

L.J. 1151, 1155 (1981).
108
See Carrington, supra note 8, at 416-17 (arguing that error correction, and not law
making, was the reason for creating the circuit courts).
109
id at 425.
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the summary affirmance without oral argument is indistinguishable
from a denial of certiorari. In each case there is no argument, no
opinion, no precedent, no accountability, and no assurance that any
Article III judge has devoted enough time to the case to determine
whether the decision is correct." 0
There is, of course, one significant difference between the two
situations. Congress has authorized the Supreme Court to act as a
certiorari court,"' but has required the courts of appeals to hear
every litigant's appeal as a matter of right. Thus, the transformation
of the circuit courts has not only been unwise, but lawless as well.
B.

The Price of Reform: Diminished Quality

In its 1990 report, the Federal Courts Study Committee asserted
that "the courts of appeals have managed to avoid the worst effects of
this [caseload] growth."" 2 Indeed, the Committee stated that "there
has been no systematic breakdown in the quality of the courts'
work.""13 However, the Report provides no basis for the Committee's
assertion, and, it is largely impossible to verify at least with respect to
appeals that get the full Learned Hand treatment. In many cases,
however, it is demonstrably false. In particular, oral argument obviously has the potential to be of value in many cases where it is not
granted, and its denial clearly diminishes the quality of the court's
work. Additionally, the poor quality of so many unpublished opinions
provides stark evidence that there has been a "systemic breakdown" in
the work-product of the circuit courts. Moreover, the proliferation of
central staff has further removed the judge from the actual decision
making process, necessarily reducing both quality and accountability.
Finally, the perception of ajudge's proper role has been altered, perhaps irrevocably, to supervisor rather than sole decision maker.
Although the Committee's Report proclaims continued high
quality, its language and tacit assumptions make clear the degradation
of the appellate process. The Report states that "[Federal] judges do
much of their own work, grant oral argument in cases that need it, decide cases with sufficient thought, and produce opinions in cases ofprece110 In a similar vein, Professor Levinson, after observing that ajustice of the Supreme
Court might devote only ten minutes per cert petition on average, noted that "the
Supreme Court, at least at the level of decisions on certiorari, is better conceived of as a
bureaucratic organization-and subject to bureaucratic imperatives-than as anything that
might plausibly be described as a truly deliberative body." Sanford Levinson, StrategyJurispnidnce, and Certiorari 79 VA. L. REv. 717, 731 n.75 (1993) (reviewing H.W. PERRY, JR.,
DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETrING IN THE UNITED STATES SuPREmE COURT (1991)).
Ill See 28 U.S.C. §1257.
112
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE

FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE].

113

Id.

110 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE
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dential importance with the care they deserve .... 1114 There is no pretense
now that judges do all of their own work, or that oral argument is
readily available. Even more interesting is the implicit recognition
that unpublished opinions receive less care." 5 Indeed, the same report concluded that procedural changes have "transformed [the appellate courts] from the institutions they were even a generation
ago.""16 Six years ago a blue-ribbon ABA committee reported that
The response to increasing caseload by increasing the number of
judges and staff and increasing the proportion of cases decided
without oral argument has generated a second set of problems concerned with the quality and uniformity of justice on appeal. The
caseload may prove
side effects of the standard cures for increasing
117
to be as serious as the original disease.
This prophecy has proven all too true. And, sadly, the poor and the
powerless have borne the brunt of the "side effects of the standard
cures."
C.

The Price of Reform: Disparate Impact

A court is far less likely to hear oral argument or issue a published
opinion in a social security or civil rights case, a prisoner petition, or
the like than it is to hear argument or publish an opinion in an "important" securities or antitrust case. Central staff takes the lead in
"trivial cases," the unwanted stepchildren of the appellate process, by
writing initial opinions which receive only abbreviated review by the
judges themselves; after all, if most such cases are "chaff," the "the
judges are perfectly rational in choosing to rubber-stamp rather than
read."" 8 It is not surprising, therefore, that the rate of reversal of
district court judgments has been cut in half since 1960.119 The cumulative effect of truncated procedures has a devastating impact on
the rights of those most in need ofjudicial protection, those litigants
whose claims raise no systemic law-making concerns, but only the
claim that they have been denied justice at the trial court. According
to Dean Carrington:
114

Id. at 109 (emphasis added).

115

See COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrED

STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 34 (1994) [hereinafter PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN] (The "hallmarks of the federal appellate system" are: "oral argu-

ment granted in appropriatematters... [and] careful opinionsproduced in cases of precedential
import.") (emphasis added).
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 109.
ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 529.
Mary Lou Stow & HaroldJ. Spaeth, Examining an Analogy: Does theJudicialMonster
Eat Chaff, 75JUDICATURE 294, 294 (1992).
119 See ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 546.
116

117
118
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A court that functions with a substantially junior staff, whose judges
have no visible contact with appellate litigants or their lawyers, who
may even have little contact with one another, and whose judges
often make no effort to explain their decisions is one which gives
little assurance of its willingness and ability to perform the error
1 20
correction function.
Of course, this unfortunate result does not come from any deliberate
attempt to harm those groups; the federal appellate courts remain a
bulwark protecting the citizenry. Nevertheless, the harm is there for
all to see; judges are simply less likely to devote serious effort and
attention to the routine veterans' benefit denial appeal than to the
routine corporate tax case. The discrimination may be ad hoc rather
than planned, defacto and not dejure, but it is nonetheless real. One
of the basic important principles behind Anglo-American law is that
moral responsibility attaches to harm done with the elbows as well as
the fists.
The standard explanation for the existence of different tracks of
justice is that some cases are more "important" than others. This explanation really has two elements: First, the decisions in important
cases may have more immediate impact on the nation; and second,
the precedents established in important cases are more useful. Both
explanations have intuitive appeal. A ruling on the legality of a
merger between two major corporations has more immediate economic impact than does a ruling on the validity of a social security
claim. Similarly, the precedent set in the merger case will control
more economic activity than the one set in the social security claim.
This dichotomy, however, justifies the different tracks only if economic impact is the only measure of the judicial system. 121 Surely that
is not so. Justice serves ends other than those of the Invisible Hand, a
truth Congress implicitly recognized when it created the circuit courts
in order to provide a method for effectively correcting error at the
trial level. 1 22 Unfortunately, the cost of the contemporary judicialfocus on lawmaking rather than error correction largely falls on those
with "unimportant" cases-the poor and powerless. Not only is the
quality of decision making lower in those cases, but the system pays
another heavy price-the loss of perceived legitimacy.' 23 Ourjudicial
system can answer the cynics' charges of a systematic tilt toward the
Carrington, supra note 8, at 428-29.
It is not even clear that the current tracks are economically efficient. The argument certainly exists that a myriad of small decisions and little precedents have a cumulative economic impact similar to that of a few large decisions.
122
See Carrington, supra note 8, at 417-19.
Robel, supranote 21, at 58. As Professor Robel has written: "We need ourjudges
123
120
121

most in ordinary cases, not to exercise the wisdom of Solomon... but legitimately exercise
the power of the government." Id.
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rich and powerful only if the courts police themselves rigorously and
deliver on their sworn promise of equal justice.
Professor Baker recently stated that "[t]he ultimate question is
whether this generation of judges is presiding over the demise of the
federal appellate tradition. 1 2 4 A key tenet of that tradition, the
maxim that "the law is no respecter of persons" is clearly at risk. But
there is more at stake than mere tradition. Tradition, after all, is
worth preserving only if it furthers social goals. It is therefore significant that the Learned Hand model does further social goals by assuring that the complaints of eveiy litigant-small or large, rich or poorare given equal treatment by those most powerful of governmental
figures, the judges of the federal courts of appeals. Thus, it is not so
much "tradition" that is at stake. Rather, it is the American judicial
system's basic guarantee of justice to all in equal measure that is
threatened. Damages caused by the current breach of that promise
are severe and incalculable. The next Part of this Article considers
whether they are unavoidable.
III
THE OBVIOUS SOLUTION:

MORE JUDGES

It is time to face the real problem. If we are not to abandon the

tradition of "one appeal as of right," and if we are to make this a
true appeal in the traditional sense-one to be heard and decided
by judges-we need both more judges and more circuits. 12

A.

Opposition from the Judiciary: An Overview

One way to view the federal appellate courts is as an enormously
over-stressed institution in the hands of selfless judges engaged in heroic and creative judicial triage. Certainly the caseload is staggering
and the courts lack sufficientjudges. The staffing model used by the
Administrative Office reveals that 161 judges are doing the work of

BA .,supra note 13, at 29.
Rubin, supranote 77, at 459. What is most remarkable aboutJudge Rubin's diagnosis is its date-1976. In the intervening 20 years, caseload and bureaucratization have both
increased radically. Conditions that Rubin thought were becoming intolerable, were only
the beginning of the decline of the circuit courts into courts of discretionary appellate
124
125

jurisdiction.

298

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:273

277.126 And the judges are keeping current.' 27 They do so by working
long, and in some cases, inhuman hours 28 and by using every reasonable case processing innovation from limited publication, to screening, to reduced argument. Thus, like physicians in a mass disaster,
they have devised means to apportion their attention to those cases in
which they believe it is most needed and can do the most good.
Although the system is not ideal, at least the judges are not at fault.
Under difficult conditions, they have done everything in their power
to produce the maximum result with the inadequate resources Con126 As of 1992, there are 179 authorized judgeships for the regional courts of appeals.
The actual number of active judges is somewhat lower because of unfilled vacancies. L.
RALPH MECHAM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES COURTS 99 tbl. 30 (1992) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. TheJudicial Conference has adopted 255 "merits dispositions" as the maximum desirable workload for a
circuitjudge. See GORDON BEANr ET AL., FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 9

(1993) [hereinafter MORATORIUM]. In 1992, the courts of appeals recorded 23,597 merits
dispositions, each requiring three judicial votes for a total of 70,791. Dividing by 161 active
circuit judges results in 439 participations per active judge. Dividing by 178 authorized
judgeships yields 397 participations perjudgeship. According to the Judicial Conference
formula, 277 active judgeships would be required to handle the current caseload. See AN.
NUAL REPORT, supra, at 131 tbl. B-1.
127 The average time from the filing of the last brief until hearing or submission was
3.3 months, and from hearing to final disposition, 2.5 months. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
126, at 151 tbl. B4.
128 In response to an opinion survey undertaken by the Federal Courts Study Committee, 81% of the currentjudges reported that the workload was "heavy" or "overwhelming."
See Robel, supra note 21, at 38. The judges' narrative responses reinforce the point:
Done properly, the work is overwhelming. The only way that I can do my
work properly is to work nights and weekends. As long as one has the vigor,
stamina and good health, it can be done. Eventually, this schedule is
bound to take its toll.
My work hours have increased to occupy substantially all of my available time. I would not today accept an appointment to this court if I knew
the workload-but I have too much invested to get out.
My typical day begins at 5:30 a.m. including weekends when I get most
of my writing done. I feel I am becoming narrowly focused and less of a
generally knowledgeable individual, and consequently in many ways less
competent as ajudge. I try to keep up friendships and have done so only
because my friends are tolerant of my neglect. There is so little time for the
pleasures of family and outside activities. I feel guilty when I do take any
time off-like Sunday afternoon.

I calculated I spent 299 days on judicial work last year. Since I took
about two and one-half weeks of vacation, it will be seen that I worked on
Saturdays more than half the time and on at least 15 or 16 Sundays. This is
entirely too much for me and it is especially difficult for the younger judges
who have the responsibility of families with small children. This known factor has caused one very able trial judge to indicate he no longer wished to
seek the vacancy that will occur when I seek senior status.
Id. at 39-40.
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gress and society have apportioned the problem of federal appellate
justice.
This picture leaves out one crucial and surprising fact. The Judicial Establishment has consistently lobbied againstthe single most obvious solution to the caseload glut-the creation of additional
judgeships. To meet the Judicial Conference's staffing models and to
treat every appellate case with the full traditional appellate process
would require more than half again the current number of circuit
courtjudgeships (277 instead of 179). Ironically, the judiciary has opposed this solution vigorously. To continue the medical analogy, it
would be as though the busy surgeon, rushing from one important
case to the next while "screening" out the unworthy cases, rejected the
help of additional doctors to improve the situation. As odd as it
sounds, the judiciary has done just that. Individual judges have written and spoken passionately against the creation of enough judgeships to handle the load. 2 9 Individual circuits have passed
resolutions urging Congress not to create newjudgeships. 3 0° The powerful Judicial Conference routinely requests only a small percentage
of the judgeships required to satisfy staffing models.' 3 ' National judicial planning and study groups also have inveighed against substantial
increases. Thus, the Judicial Conference Committee on Courts Administration and Case Management recommended that federal judgeships (district and circuit) be limited to one-thousand, a number that
would permanently assure inadequate capacity in the Court of Appeals.' 3 2 Similarly, the Judicial Conference Committee on Long
Range Planning, while rejecting a numerical ceiling, favored "con129
See, e.g.,Jon 0. Newman, 1,000Judges-The Limit for an Effective FederalJudiciay,76
JUDICATURE 187 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until
1984? An Essay on Delegationand Specializationof theJudicialFunction, 56 S. CAL.L.REv. 761
(1983); Gerald B. Tjoflat, MoreJudges, LessJustice,A.BAJ.,July 1993, at 70;Justice Antonin
Scalia, Remarks before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the Natural Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 15, 1987), in WIAM W SCHWARZER & RUSSELL R.
WHEELER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CIVL AND CRIMiNALJusTIE 44 (Long-Range Planning Series, Paper No. 2, 1994) [hereinaf-

ter FEDERALzAmTIoN]. However, somejudges disagree and favor substantial increases in the
number ofjudges. See, e.g., King, supra note 7; Reinhardt, Surveys, supra note 2; Reinhardt,

Too Few, Too Many, supra note 5. Nonetheless, they do not control the policy and planning
apparatus of the federal judiciary. See infra text accompanying notes 132-35.
130 The actions of the Eleventh CircuitJudicial Council in 1989 are reported in BAKER,
supra note 13, at 203.
131 In 1992, the Judicial Conference requested that Congress create nine additional
circuitjudgeships; the Conference's own staffing model called for nearly 100. REPORTS OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 69-70 (Sept. 1992)
[hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].
132 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND
CASE MANAGEMENT TO THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING 3
(Feb. 16, 1993) [hereinafter COURT ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE REPORT].
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trolled" growth in judgeships "only after other appropriate alterna133
tives have been exhausted."
In support of this rather paradoxical position, the Judicial Establishment has offered a wide array of extremely weak arguments.
Nearly all of these arguments rely on factual premises with no empirical support, and some depend on assumptions contradicted by the
only available studies.' 34 Others rely on classic logical or statistical fallacies,13 5 and still others reveal an amazing insensitivity to the needs of
litigants and intimate the belief that the courts of appeals exist to provide professional satisfaction for judges rather than appellate capacity
13 6
for the nation.
Some of the anti-expansion arguments inveigh against creating
new circuits, others oppose enlarging the existing circuits, and still
others reject the establishment of nationwide courts of specialized
subject matter jurisdiction. Despite the differing approaches of the
anti-expansion arguments, two features unite them: They all seek to
restrict the size of the federal judiciary, and nearly all of the arguments are weak, some embarrassingly so-the sort of arguments that
the judges would reject out of hand had they been asserted by advocates practicing before their courts. The next subsection examines
the various arguments against expansion.
B. Arguments Against Additional Judgeships
1.

Quality of the Bench

Some opponents of increasing judicial capacity stress the inevitable decline in the quality of the bench that would accompany expansion. In its purest form (i.e., that there are not enough good judicial
candidates to supply a substantial number of new judgeships) 3 7 this
argument is hard to take seriously. In 1960, there were 4205 attorneys
for each circuit judgeship; by 1993 that number had increased to
4880.138 Today, adding enough judgeships to meet the Judicial Con133
134

PROPOSED LONG RANGE PIAN, supra note 115, at 32.
See discussion infra part II.B.3.a.

See discussion infra part M.B.3.a-b.
See discussion infra parts HI.B.4-5, V.
See Newman, supra note 129, at 188. Judge Newman argues:
A federal judiciary of 3,000 to 4,000... would also include an unacceptable
number of mediocre and even a few unqualified people. Today, most observers regard the overall quality of the federal judiciary as higher than that
of the average statejudiciary. At a size of 3,000 to 4,000, its quality would be
indistinguishable from the most pedestrian of state judiciaries.
138 In 1960, there were 68 circuit courtjudgeships, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, Supra
note 115, at 13, and 285,933 attorneys, STATIsTIcA AL-sTRACr OF THE UNrrED STATES 210
tbl. 637 (1994) [hereinafter STATISTrICAL ABsTRAcr]. By 1993, judgeships had increased to
135

136
137

167, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 13, and total attorneys to 815,000,
STATisncA. ABarRAr, supra

at 407 tbl. 637.
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ference's staffing model (about 100 added to the current total of 179)
would still leave nearly 3000 attorneys per circuitjudgeship13 9 Surely
among those 3000 lawyers is one willing and able to be a circuit court
judge. 140 Moreover, there are over 600141 federal district judges and
about 800 state appellate judges; 142 it is hard to argue that such a pool
could not produce 100 distinguished candidates for the circuit courts.
It is equally frivolous to contend that among the hundreds of law
professors, senior partners, senior United States Attorneys, and public
defenders there are not enough qualified and willing applicants.
A variation on the basic dilution-of-quality argument asserts that
substantial increases in the number of circuit judgeships will reduce
the prestige of the position and thus diminish the pool of distinguished attorneys willing to serve on the bench. 143 Opponents of additional judgeships make this argument confidently, as though its
factual premises were beyond dispute. In fact, however, there is no
empirical evidence that additional judgeships will reduce prestige or
that reduced prestige will diminish the pool of judicial candidates.14 4
139

Adding 100judges to the current total of 179 yields 279judges. Dividing the cur-

rent total number of attorneys (815,000) by the number ofjudgeships yields 2921 attorneys
per judgeship.
140 The average quality of this pool of 3,000 lawyers is probably higher than it was in
1960. First, the population of aspiring lawyers is much larger because of the augmentation
of the pool with significant numbers of women and minorities. Second, admissions screening in law schools is much more sophisticated than it was in 1960. Additionally, law schools
themselves have much better, larger libraries, larger and more professional full-time faculties, and much more sophisticated curricula (including clinical and skills-simulation offerings) than they did in 1960. Finally, continuing legal education after law school is much
more prevalent now than it was in 1960.
141 In 1992, the number of authorized district court judgeships was 649. ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 126, at 61 tbl. 5.
142 There are about 800 state intermediate appellate judges and supreme court justices. DANIELJOHN MEADOR, AMERICAN COURTS 92-93 app. B (1991).
143
See Irving R. Kaufman, New Remediesfor the Next Century ofJudicialReform: Time As the
GreatestInnovator,57 FoRDHAm L. REv. 253, 260-61 (1988). Justice Frankfurter earlier wrote
that "inflation in the number of... judges will result, by its own Gresham's law, in a
depreciation of the judicial currency." Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S.
48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). By that reasoning, of course, the prestige and
quality of the judiciary have been declining steadily since 1789.
Predictably, Judge Posner's variation of the argument emphasizes economics. He
maintains that high quality candidates could be found even if the number ofjudgeships
were very high (e.g., 500), but only ifjudicial salaries were to increase to politically unacceptable levels. See POSNER, supra note 44, at 99. Posner apparently believes that high
quality candidates will come disproportionately from among the group of high-income
lawyers. However, for many able candidates (state judges, professors, prosecutors, and
public defenders), a circuit judge's salary would come as a handsome raise.
144 It is equally plausible that prestige is controlled not by the number ofjudges, but by
the quality of the work they do. See Frank M. Coffin, Research for Efficiency and Quality:
Review of ManagingAppeals in Federal Courts, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1857, 1867 (1990) ("If the
work is rewarding and important, there will be more than sufficient prestige.") Absent
empirical evidence, there is no reason to prefer Judge Kaufman's speculation, see supra
note 143, to that ofJudge Coffin.
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The limited evidence that is available suggests the opposite. For example, circuit judgeships have not become harder to fill as their
number has increased almost threefold since 1950, nor is there a
dearth of able and willing applicants.1 45 Furthermore, district judgeships-now totaling 649146-produce ample applicant pools, again
suggesting that circuitjudgeships could increase threefold without diminishing the quality or quantity of judicial candidates. Absent supporting evidence, speculation that a substantial increase in judgeships
will make the positions less attractive and reduce the quality of the
applicant pool should receive no credence at all; this is an empirical
question that can be investigated, and thus far it has not been.
Another variation on the basic theme of dilution focuses on the
appointment process. The argument is that an increase in the
number of appointments reduces the visibility and scrutiny of each
appointment, 147 thus permitting the political process to forward and
confirm mediocre or incompetent candidates.148 According to this
line of reasoning, an appointment to a small court consisting of six or
seven judges produces intense scrutiny from the bar, the press, the
academy, and the public. However, the argument goes, as the court
grows to twenty or thirty or fifty, vacancies will become so common
that they will provoke much less attention and scrutiny.
Once again, this anti-expansionist argument depends on factual
assertions utterly devoid of empirical support. Would there really be
less scrutiny if appointments were more numerous and would the diminished scrutiny really result in lower quality judges? There is very
little evidence concerning either of these issues, and the limited evidence that exists suggests that neither result would occur. There has
been no noticeable reduction in scrutiny or quality as the circuit
bench has tripled in size in the last forty years. Nor does scrutiny of
the many more district court nominees appear to be less rigorous
than that focused at the circuit level. Furthermore, even though the
circuits differ radically in size, varying from six judgeships in the First
145

See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 13.

146

1&

A simpler version of the argument highlights the cost of the appointments process
itself. According to this argument, as the number ofjudgeships grows, the appointments
process will become too burdensome for Congress and result in confirmations that occur
without thorough investigation and scrutiny. See MORATORIuM, supra note 126, at 3M-4.
147

This argument mistakenly assumes that the nomination and confirmation process involves
a substantial amount of senatorial attention. In fact, the F.B.I. performs the investigations,
and staff does most of the other work involved. Hearings usually take a few minutes. Id. at
34. In 1992, there were 66 federal judicial appointments. Id. at 33. Assuming an average
term of 10 years, adding 100 additional judgeships would require an average of 10 more
appointments each year-a workload unlikely to cripple the Senate.
148
See Newman, supra note 129, at 187.

1996]

THE LEARNED HAND TRADITION

Circuit to twenty-eight in the Ninth Circuit, 49 no clear variations in
scrutiny or quality have appeared among them. Finally, even supposing that numerical increases could reduce scrutiny and thus quality,
there is no indication of the relevant numbers or proportions. In
other words, exactly what size increases would harm scrutiny and quality? Is there a linear and direct correlation, or are there thresholds
instead? For example, a 1000% increase in judgeships might have.a
substantial impact on scrutiny and quality, while an increase of 100%
(the largest increase suggested so far) might have none. These questions have never been investigated, nor even seriously posed. Given
this lack of evidence, it makes little sense to rely on reduced scrutiny
and quality as reasons to oppose the needed increases in capacity.
All variations of the quality-of-the-bench argument suffer from an
additional and very serious flaw. They all focus on the quality of the
active circuit judges-not on the quality of the appellate justice dispensed. The two are distinctly different, because active circuit judges
are responsible for only a part of the work of the circuit courts. To see
the point clearly, recall the two-track system of justice described in
Parts I and II, above. First, consider Track-One-the portion of the
circuit courts' terminations that are decided using the traditional appellate process (oral argument, conference, published opinion)about half the total. Active circuit judges are responsible for only
eighty percent of the participations in those cases; the remaining
twenty percent is provided by senior and visiting judges. 50 Presumably, large increases in the number of active judgeships would reduce
or eliminate the need for participations by senior and visiting district
judges and would increase the participations by active current judges.
The justice dispensed by the new, active circuitjudges probably would
not be lower, in average quality, than that dispensed by the visiting
and senior judges currently performing the work.
Next, consider the Track-Two cases-those cases that are
screened out of the traditional appellate process. These cases are not
argued, often there is no conference, no opinion is published and, in
some cases, no opinion is even written. These cases get very little attention from the judges;' 5 ' most of the work is done by staff attorneys
and law clerks. Thus, for nearly half the circuit courts' caseload there
is already a substantial breakdown in the quality of the appellate process. If active judgeships were to increase significantly, however, the
need for screening would cease or diminish, and these track-two cases
149 MORATORUM, supranote 126, at 51 tbl. 4.
150 See McKENNA, supranote 3, at 38. As of 1991, the Fifth Circuit did not even guarantee litigants that a three-judge panel would consist of a majority of active, resident circuit
judges. See BAKER, supranote 13, at 199.
151 See supra part I.C.
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would receive much more judicial attention than they receive now. A
substantial increase in active judgeships (even if it were to decreaseaverage judge quality) would eliminate the need for visiting judges and
for "screening," and would therefore substantially increase the average
level of active circuit judge attention per case, thereby increasing the
average quality of appellate justice dispensed by the courts.
The problem can be viewed as one of resource allocation or distributive justice. If the system creates more appellate judgeships, it is
possible that the average quality of the judges may decline minimally.
Accordingly, the quality of appellate justice in the cases already receiving the luxury of the full traditional appellate process might also decline somewhat. In other words, the rich may become less rich. But
more judgeships also means that the quality ofjustice dispensed in the
cases currently screened out of plenary treatment would vastly increase. In other words, the poor would become less poor. On the
other hand, restricting the number ofjudgeships virtually insures that
the poor will get poorer and that the number of poor will increase in
proportion to caseload. It violates modem conceptions of distributive
justice to refuse to create a massive benefit for those currently deprived of quality appellate justice in order to preserve a minor benefit
15 2
for those already enjoying the lion's share of the system's resources.
Yet that is precisely the effect of refusing to create additional appellate
capacity.
2.

It Costs Too Much

Opponents of additional appellate capacity often mention, but
seldom consider in depth, the cost of new judgeships. 15 3 The numbers do seem formidable at first glance. The annual cost of salaries,
benefits, and direct chambers support for a circuit judgeship is
$475,900; adding $338,100 for court operations and maintenance
yields a total annual figure of $814,000.1 54 If 100 new judgeships are
needed to generate adequate capacity, the annual bill is just over $80
million-a considerable figure.' 5 5
That figure, however, like any large number, can be understood
only through comparisons. 15 6 The federal government spends only
152
153

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83 (1971).
See, e.g. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 32; Kaufnan, supra note

143, at 258 (1988); see alsoBAKER, supra note 13, at 203; MORATORIUM, supra note 126, at 35-

36.
154

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, COST TO THEJUDICIARY OF ESTABLISH-

ING A NEWJUDGFSHIP (1992), cited in MORATORIUM, supra note 126, at 36 tbl. 3.
155 This figure overstates the cost considerably. Full staffing of the judiciary itself

would reduce the need for most quasi-judicial personnel-law clerks and central staffand thus save millions of dollars.
156 See, e.g., Reinhardt, Too Few, Too Many, supra note 5, at 53-54:
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two-tenths of one percent of the federal budget on the entire federal
judiciary. This amounts to about $2.6 billion out of the total of $1.4
trillion. 157 The $80 million required for 100 new judgeships in turn
amounts to less than 3% of the $2.6 billion dollar judiciary budget,
and thus about one two-hundredth of one percent of the federal
budget.
Comparisons to other federal expenditures are also revealing.
The franking privilege for members of Congress costs about $60 million per year; 158 the National Gallery of Art costs about $50 million;159
and price support payments to wool and mohair producers cost about
$180 million per year. 160 More than forty American universities receive over $70 million each in Federal Research and Development
Funds. 161 The point is clear. The federal government spends vast
sums of money on matters important and trivial. Adding one hundred new circuit judgeships would not be a major expense either as a
meaningful fraction of the total federal budget, or by comparison to
other uses of federal dollars.
The additionaljudgeships-are-too-expensive argument suffers
from an even more crucial flaw. Even if the extra capacity were too
expensive on some platonic scale, that is a reason for Congress to refuse to create the judgeships, it is not a reason for the judiciary not to
ask for it. Put somewhat differently, even though Congress may refuse
to fund a weapons system, the generals are usually willing to ask for
it.162 In the congressional funding game, each budgetary supplicant
[T]he cost of operating the judicial system is an infinitesimal part of
our national expenditures. We spend only three-tenths of 1 percent of our
federal budget on our court system. We spend almost as much on one
Stealth bomber as we do on the whole federal judicial system. We could
run the entire federal judiciary for 15 years on the cost of a single space
station.
157
BUDGET OF THE UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT, ANALYrICAL PERSPECTIVES, FIscALYEAR
1995, at 104 tbl. 7-2 (1994). The figure is taken from the "1993 actual" column because
more recent figures are estimates.
158

Id. at 14-15.

159
160

Id.at 967.
1d. at 154.

STATISTICAL ABsTacr, supranote 138, at 611 tbl. 973.
Worries about the national budget have not stopped the judiciary from lobbying
for lavish spending on federal court houses, especially those in New York and Boston.
Requests for extras such as operating windows, terrazzo floors, private bathrooms, showers
and kitchens, English gardens, French doors, custom lighting fixtures, English oak paneling, a public boat dock, and a design by world-famous architects put the projects hundreds
of millions of dollars over budget. See Melinda Henneberger, Repot Assails Cost Overrunsfor
New Court, N.Y. TImsS, Dec. 14, 1994, at B1, B7; Bob Hohler, Senate PanelRips Breyer Over
Fan Pier,BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1994, at 1; Sydney H. Schanberg, A Federal Courthouse
Fiascofor Foley Square, NEwSDAY, Dec. 16, 1994, at A53. An investigation by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public works uncovered found that one out of eight dollars
spent on the projects was wasted-a total of over $500 million. See Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, Press Release, Courthouse Construction Costs (Dec. 15, 1994).
161
162
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emphasizes the paramount importance of its needs to the national
welfare, jockeying with the others to increase its slice of the pie. It is
then the job of Congress to choose among the competing claims. The
budget process thus relies on the judiciary to inform Congress of the
resources needed to do the job-not to engage in self-censorship by
asking for only ten percent of the needed positions. 163 If budget cutting is later required because of more pressing national priorities, it is
for Congress to weigh the requests of the judiciary, the military, the
National Gallery, the universities, and the wool producers and then to
establish national value preferences. The Constitution gives the job of
making these comparisons and choices to Congress-not to the
courts.
The judiciary's failure to make the appropriate requests is especially damaging because Congress and the public (and even the bar)
are largely ignorant of the problems of the courts of appeals. Without
meaning to, the judges have hidden the problem of insufficient capacity by remaining current. Instead of permitting a scrutiny-provoking
backlog to develop, they have adopted the appellate screening (or
triage) regime, thus decreasing the quality rather than the quantity of
their output. Further, they have screened out of the traditional process those cases that are the least likely to draw the attention of any
powerful observer-social security appeals, habeas corpus cases, prisoner civil rights cases, and pro se litigation generally. As a result, Congress lacks the information it needs to perform its budgetary role
properly. Under these circumstances, and with other constituencies
constantly clamoring for a larger slice of the budgetary pie, Congress
is unlikely to notice, on its own, the need for more judgeships in the
courts of appeals.
Nor did fiscal restraint stop the judiciary from petitioning Congress for funds for
other resources. See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supranote 115, at 71-86 (providing 30

separate recommendations to ensure adequate funding including: appropriations to offset
the impact on the judiciary of new legislation, funding through general appropriations
rather than user fees, regular cost-of-living adjustments to judicial salaries, increased pension credit for bankruptcy judges and magistrates who later become Article III judges,
increased pay for senior judges, increased resources for nomination and confirmation,
increased security for judges, more technology, improved working conditions for court
support personnel, and the provision of continuing education for judges).
Constitutional diffidence cannot explain the judiciary's failure to ask Congress for
morejudgeships. Thejudicial establishment shows no reluctance to tell Congress how to
do its job so as to improve the quality of justice. See, e.g., PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN,

supra note 115, at 29 ("Congress should refrain from providing federal agency or court
jurisdiction over disputes involving economic or personnel relations or personal liability
arising in the workplace."). Thejudiciary's willingness to provide officious advice to Congress on proper legislative goals contrasts starkly with its unwillingness to accurately inform
Congress of what the judiciary needs to carry out its own mission.
163 In 1992 the Judicial Conference asked Congress to create nine additional judgeships instead of the nearly 100 called for by the Conference's own staffing model. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 131, at 69-70.
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In the end, of course, the question comes down to the quality of
justice the nation can afford. Economic efficiency has never been the
only goal sought by American law; surely we would prize racial equality even if doing so were costly and inefficient. That does not mean
racial justice will be sought at any price, but it does mean that Pareto
Optimality is not the only goal. The trade-off betweenjustice and efficiency (and all of the other demands on the nation's budget) is, of
course, one for Congress to make. Moreover, that trade-off is exactly
the kind of "polycentric" decision that courts are ill-equipped to handle.' 6 4 And yet, judicial adoption of the appellate triage regime has
made the judiciary, rather than Congress, the decision maker concerning who gets how much justice.
3.

Unstable Law: The Great Red Herring

Opponents of increases in appellate capacity have argued that
such increases will lead to instability in the law.' 65 According to this
argument, if Congress adds judgeships to existing circuits, the circuit
courts will decide more cases and the law of the circuit will become
muddled by "so many uncoordinated opinions from so many
judges."' 66 Furthermore, the argument goes, adding judges to a given
circuit increases geometrically the total number of permutations of
three judge panels 167 and thus increases the unpredictability of outcomes within that circuit. Unpredictability, in turn, promotes a
higher rate of appeal as losing litigants find it increasingly worthwhile
to "take their chances" by appealing. Thus, more judges means more
appeals.' 68 Alternatively, Congress could add capacity and avoid intracircuit inconsistency by adding more circuits, however, anti expansionists contend that doing so would increase intercircuit conflicts,
169
which already are too numerous for the Supreme Court to resolve.
No matter how Congress adds capacity, morejudges means more decisions. And those opposed to increased appellate capacity vehemently
argue that the excess decisions will overwhelm the capacity of commentators to monitor and evaluate them, 170 to the advantage of
wealthy litigants who can afford to keep track of the burgeoning law
71
and against poor litigants who cannot'1
164

Lon L Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 394-404

(1978).

165 See BAKER, supranote 13, at 206-07; Breyer, supra note 8, at 37-40 (1990); Newman,
supra note 129, at 188; Tjoflat, supra note 129, at 70.
166

REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE, supra note 112, at 114.

ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 541 (1989); Tjoflat, supra note 129, at 71-72.
BAKER, supra note 13, at 211; Tjoflat, supra note 129, at 71.
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMnTTEE, supra note 112, at 7; Newman,
supra note 129, at 188.
170 Breyer, supra note 8, at 39.
171 Id at 40.
167
168
169
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This instability-of-the-law argument is fatally flawed: it is contrary
to the empirical evidence and subject to a powerful reductio ad absurdum argument. Further, it ignores effective alternatives for reducing inconsistency, and it radically underestimates the costs of the
present system of two-track justice.
a. Empirical Support
The first of many problems with the instability-of-the-law argument is that its crucial premises lack any empirical support. There
simply is no evidence that increasing the number ofjudgeships within
a circuit reduces the stability of circuit law or increases the rate of
appeal. Nor is there any evidence that increasing the number of circuits will create a serious problem of unresolved inter-circuit conflicts.
Indeed, the data suggest precisely the contrary.
i.

Inconsistency and Circuit Size

The available evidence suggests that intracircuit inconsistency is
not a serious problem and that its prevalence is not a function of the
number of judges within the circuit. The data on these issues come
from two major studies: an opinion study performed by the Federal
Judicial Center in response to a Congressional mandate, 72 and a series of case studies of the Ninth Circuit commissioned by the Executive Committee of the Ninth Circuit Conference. 7 3
The Federal Judicial Center opinion study reported that 80% of
the responding circuit judges' 7 4 believed that lack of clear circuit precedent was a small or non-existent problem. 175 The highest percentage of judges expressing concern came from the Sixth Circuit
(thirteen authorized judgeships) and the next highest from the Ninth
(twenty-seven judgeships). 176 Because circuitjudges might understate
the problem in order to defend their own work, the responses of the
district judges are even more interesting. Sixty-eight percent of the
district judges considered the problem of unclear circuit precedent to
be small or non-existent. 177 The highest percentage of district judges
expressing dissatisfaction came from the Ninth Circuit (the nation's
Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, § 302(c).
RESRMUCrURING JUsTMCE (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990). See also Arthur D.
Hellman, Breakingthe Banc: The Common Law Process in the LargeAppelkate Cour 23 Amiz. ST.
LJ. 915 (1991) [hereinafter Breaking the Banc]; Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism andJurisprudence: The Theory and Practices of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 541
(1989) [hereinafter Jumboism and Jurispnudence].
174
McKENNA, supra note 3, at 93. Over 1400 federal judges responded to the survey,
including 81% of active circuit judges and 83% of active districtjudges. Id.at 2.
175 Ik at 93.
176 Id.
172
173

177
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largest), but the next highest came from the First Circuit (the nation's
smallest with only six authorized circuit judgeships). 178 These results
suggest that unclear precedent is not the problem that opponents of
additional judgeships suppose. The results also fail to show any clear
correlation between circuit size and perceptions of uncertainty. 17 9
The Ninth Circuit case studies, conducted by Professor Hellman,
targeted inconsistency of circuit precedent and unpredictability of decisions. Hellman examined a sample of one fifth of the published
opinions of the Ninth Circuit for 1983 and 1986.180 He found little
evidence of intracircuit conflict. In about half of the cases, there was
no evidence of any contrary precedent within the circuit. When arguably contrary precedents did exist, they typically supplied only oblique support for the losing litigant's position. Even when the
contrary precedent offered direct support for the losing litigant, the
panel was usually able to distinguish clearly between the sample case
and the contrary precedent. 181 Most examples of inconsistency dealt
with issues governed by fact-specific, multi-factor, or indeterminate
legal standards such as probable cause for an arrest, personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, or "rule of reason" cases. 18 2 Professor
Hellman concluded that these issues were likely to cause unpredictability regardless of the number of applicable precedents and, therefore, regardless of circuit size. 183
In a further effort to gauge uncertainty in the law of the circuit,
Hellman examined separate dissenting and concurring opinions on
172 issues in the sample. 184 His analysis led him to conclude that the
primary cause of unpredictable outcomes in the Ninth Circuit was not
178

Id. at 94. Empirical findings do not appear relevant to advocates of court-capping.

In spite of the survey results, Judge Tjoflat recently remarked, "One need not be clairvoyant to foresee that the rule of law will be clearer and more stable in the first circuit than it
will be in the second, with its jumbo court.'" Gerald Bard Tjoflat, The FederaIJudiciary:A
Scarce Resource 27 CoNN. L REv. 871, 873 (1995).

179 The American Bar Association Appellate Practice Committee created the Subcommittee to Study Circuit Size. The subcommittee, composed of experienced appellate advocates, found "no evidence that a larger circuit necessarily causes significantly more
intracircuit conflict than a circuit of ten to fifteen judges." See Report on Federal CircuitSize,
APPELrAE PRAc.J. & UPDATE 3 (Winter 1993). Accordingly, the "Subcommittee found no
compelling reasons why circuit courts of various sizes-ranging from a fewjudges to fiftycannot effectively meet the caseload challenge. Indeed for every argument in favor of
smaller circuits, there is an equally compelling argument for larger circuits." Id. at 2.
180 Hellman, Breaking the Banc, supra note 173, at 920-21.
181 Hellman, Jumboism andJurisprudence supranote 173, at 595.
182 Hellman, Breaking the Ban, supra note 173, at 972.
183 Id. at 977.
184 Id. at 988. Hellman reasoned that such opinions were good markers of issues on
which the composition of the panel could produce uncertainty of outcome. Thus, "[w]e
can readily suppose that but for the luck of the draw, one of the judges in the majority
might have been replaced by ajudge who shared the views of the dissenter...." Id. at 981.
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"a plethora of circuit precedents that point in different directions." 8 5
When the panel split on the content of circuit law, the judges typically

considered the same two or three relevant cases.' 8 6 Often the disagreements did not involve circuit precedent at all, but rather the interpretation of new statutory language or legislative history, recent
Supreme Court precedent, state law, or the state of the factual rec-

ord.18 7 There were few, if any, cases in which the judges looked to
conflicting circuit precedent to support their differing conclusions.
Hellman concluded:
In short, what makes for an unpredictable outcome generally is not
an oversupply of circuit decisions, but the absence of a circuit precedent that is closely on point or, less commonly, a fact-specific rule of
law that by its nature requires case-by-case evaluation. These condidons are no more likely to occur in the large circuit than the small;
if anything, they will occur less often in the large circuit because the
larger number of decisions increases the odds that there will be a
precedent on point. 188
Hellman's conclusion resonates powerfully with experience and
common sense. The bitter truth known to all who do any legal research is that there is not too much law, but rather too little. Consider
the law of discovery. A glance at standard treatises or casebooks
185
186
187

Id. at 983.

Id.

Id. at 983-984.
Id. at 984. Justice Breyer advances three variations of the unstable law argument.
First, he argues that too many decisions, even if they do not produce a direct conflict
between abstract legal rules, can produce uncertainty by the effect that such decisions have
on "other sorts of rules, rules that grow out of the facts at hand, that arise out of the use of
an example." Hellman's findings contradict this argument. A review of Hellman's study
shows that his view of "inconsistency" is not limited to abstract legal rules, but also encompasses highly specific, fact-based rules. Indeed, his point seems even stronger in such
cases; because more decisions will encompass more factual variations and examples, the
law will become more, not less clear.
Breyer's second argument is that more opinions will swamp the efforts of those who
must criticize them. Breyer, supra note 8, at 39. This argument is well-meant but 50 years
too late. The time has long since passed when even a tiny fraction of appellate decisions
could receive serious scholarly attention. Further, the proliferation of specialty and practice-oriented journals and newsletters, and loose-leaf services means that inconsistency will
not often go unnoticed.
Breyer's third argument focuses on fairness. Breyer, supra note 8, at 40. He suggests
that only large law firms and institutional litigants will have the resources necessary to
locate and analyze the vast, new body of law. This argument would be troubling if true.
However, computer-based research tools have leveled the playing field somewhat Even if
access is not equal, Breyer's argument overlooks the basic fact that more law will benefit
those with scarce resources. Without clear circuit precedent on point, an advocate must
guess at the law-by drawing analogies or extending dicta, by researching the law of other
jurisdictions, or by reading treatises and law reviews. That is an expensive task, especially
when compared to looking up existing pieces of black-letter law. Thus, research in the
absence of precedent within the circuit requires much more time, expense, and resources
than are often available to the small or rural practitioner.
188
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reveals that many discovery issues lack any precedent at all, and that
most of the decisional law comes from the district courts. Attorneys
and trial judges dealing with these issues would find some guidance
from the appellate courts very helpful. If having more judges leads to
more precedents, trial attorneys surely would welcome that outcome.
Even when there is some law, more law re-enforces and clarifies the
rule, and thereby makes it more certain. If there is only one circuit
court opinion on an issue, another court might well feel justified in
reaching a different result. However, if several panels or circuits have
spoken on different variations of the issue, it will be the rare court
which will take a different path. In short, having more judges will
make the law more stable, not less so. 18 9
ii.

Appeal Rates and Circuit Size

A variation on the unstable law argument asserts that increasing
the number of circuitjudges would create instability in the law of the
circuit and that this instability in turn would increase the rate of appeal. The reasoning behind this argument is that, because instability
in the law of the circuit translates into unpredictable outcomes, appellants will "take their chances" that one of the many possible threejudge panels will reverse their trial court defeat.' 9 0 Increasing the
number of circuit court judgeships would therefore increase, rather
than decrease, the workload of the courts. Proponents of this argument cite the increase in national appeal rates that has accompanied
the steady growth in appellatejudgeships. They point out that in 1950
(when there were sixty-four circuit judgeships) only one in forty district court terminations resulted in appeal, while in 1989 (judgeships
having increased to 165) the appeal rate was one in eight.19 1
This argument is a classic example of the logical fallacy: post hoc
ergo propterhoc (i.e., if x precedes y, then x must have caused y). To see
the point clearly, consider that although the number of judgeships
has increased in the last thirty years, other changes in the federal appellate courts have also occurred. In that same time period, for instance, the average height of circuitjudges (adjusted for gender) has
increased. Absent some clear causal mechanism, it makes no more
sense to attribute accelerated appeal rates to additional judgeships
than to increased judicial altitude. Not every correlation is a cause.
More enlightening than the historical correlation of appeal rates
and appellate judgeships is a comparison of current appeal rates in
189 A recent study by Professor Hellman found that unresolved inter-circuit conflicts do
not present a serious problem. Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and
Extent of Unresolved IntercircuitConflicts, 56 U. Prrr. L. REv. 693 (1995).
190 See, e.g., Tjoflat, supra note 129, at 71.
191
BAKER, supra note 13, at 211.
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circuits of various sizes. If the more-judges-creates-more-appeals argument is valid, we should expect to see a relationship between circuit
size and appeal rates. In fact, however, no such correlation exists. A
comparison of the appeal rates of the circuits between 1988 and 1991
shows the Federal Circuit (twelve judges) to have the highest average
rate, and the Seventh Circuit (eleven judges) to have the lowest. The
largest circuit (the Ninth with twenty-seven judges) and the smallest
(the First with five judges) have almost identical rates of appeal.
These results strongly suggest that increasing the number of judgeships is not likely to increase rates of appeal.
In fact, other factors explain the historical increase in the appeal
rate. The forty years between 1950 and 1990 saw dramatic changes in
our system of justice. The Supreme Court recognized a criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel on appeal, legal services became available to a much larger segment of the population, pro se
litigation-particularly by state prisoners-increased radically, federal
appeals courts began protecting civil rights much more aggressively,
and the substantive law (state and federal) on many issues changed at
unprecedented rates. It seems quite likely that these trends, rather
than the increase in circuitjudgeships, caused the increase in rates of
appeal.
iii.

Intercircuit Conflict

If Congress fears intracircuit inconsistency, notwithstanding logic
and empirical evidence to the contrary, it might be unwilling to add
enough judgeships to the existing circuits to meet current needs.
Nevertheless, it could still supply the nation with adequate appellate
capacity by creating more circuits. Creating four or five additional
circuits of fifteen judges each, and increasing to fifteen the number of
judgeships in the circuits with fewer than fifteen judgeships would add
192
enough capacity to meet the Judicial Conference's staffing model.
Opponents' 93 of this solution see it merely as a trade of one kind of
inconsistency for another. They contend that although intracircuit
conflict will not increase, intercircuit conflicts will multiply far beyond
194
the Supreme Court's already inadequate capacity to resolve them.
192 We picked 15 as the number ofjudges for this comparison because it is the current
staffing of the second largest circuit. Adding five circuits of 15 judges produces a total of
75 additional judgeships. Increasing the existing circuits to 15 judges each produces an
additional 34 positions for a total of 109 newjudgeships. Adding 109 to the current 178
produces 287-10 more than the 277 required to reduce merits dispositions perjudgeship
to 255 (the maximum number a circuitjudge can be expected to produce according to the
Judicial Conference).
193 See, e.g., Thomas G. Gee, The Imminent Destruction of the Fifth Circuit: On How Not to
Deal With a BlossomingDocket 9 TExAs TECH. L. REv. 799 (1978);John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Cou4 26 Loy. L. REv. 787 (1980).
194 See BAKER, supra note 13, at 218; Newman, supra note 129, at 188.
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Once again, however, the empirical evidence suggests otherwise.
The evidence consists of another study conducted by Professor
Hellman, commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center pursuant to
Congressional request. 195 Hellman examined litigants' claims of intercircuit conflict in certiorari petitions in order to determine the
prevalence of conflicts, their tolerability, and their persistence over
time. For Hellman a conflict was "tolerable" if it had not "resulted in
differential treatment of similarly situated litigants in different parts of
the country"' 96 -that is, if it had not led to contrary outcomes in subsequent cases. A conflict would fail the "persistence" test if litigants
stopped raising the relevant issue, one of the conflicting circuits overruled its prior "conflicting" position, the Supreme Court later resolved
the questions, or subsequent legislation mooted the issue.' 97
Hellman studied 142 issues on which the Supreme Court denied
review in the 1984 and 1985 Terms, despite the existence of an intercircuit conflict. Of these, he found that the persistence and tolerability tests eliminated all but forty issues. In other words, he found
only forty conflicts in two Terms that "(a) have not been put to rest by
a subsequent Supreme Court decision or otherwise; (b) have continued to generate litigation; and (c) have controlled outcomes in one or
more reported cases."' 9 8 Further, he noted that the Supreme Court
has ample room on its docket to resolve those conflicts.' 9 9 In 1991,
for example, the Court issued only 110 plenary decisions compared
with an average of 153 in the 1981-1986 Terms. 200 The study shows
not only that unresolved intercircuit conflict is not a serious problem,
but also that the creation of several more circuits is not likely to make
it one. The absolute number of persistent, intolerable unresolved
conflicts is low, and the Supreme Court has ample capacity to resolve
them. Perhaps the addition of several new circuits might increase the
195

SeeARTHUR D. HELLMAN, FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER,UNRESOLVED INTERcIRCUIT CON-

FuCms: THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM iii (1994).

In making its request for the

study, Congress followed the recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee. See
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMnTEE, supra note 112, at 124-25.
196
HELLMAN, supra note 195, at 113. Following the suggestions of Congress and the
Federal Courts Study Committee, Hellman broke down this standard of tolerability into
four criteria. He considered whether the conflict
"(1) imposes economic costs or other harm on persons engaging in interstate commerce; (2) encourages forum shopping among circuits; (3) creates unfairness to litigants in different circuits, as in allowing Federal
benefits in one circuit that are denied in other circuits; or encourages nonacquiescence by Federal agencies in the holdings of the courts of appeals
for different circuits .... "
Id. at V. 123 (quoting § 302). See aho REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE,
supra note 112, at 125.
197 Hellman, supra note 195, at 105-12.
198 Id. at 120.
199 Id. at 121.
200

Id
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number of conflicts, but the absolute number would still be low, and
in a nation-wide common law system it is unrealistic to insist on a
"zero-tolerance" policy for conflict.
Thus, the empirical evidence against the inconsistency argument
is very strong-really, one-sided. The data are also so well known, that
reliance on the argument by the judicial establishment (all sophisticated federal judges) seems almost perverse.
b.

Reductio Ad Absurdum: The Trade-Off Between Consistency
and Capacity

Even if we assume, in spite of the currently available empirical
evidence, that new judgeships will produce significant intracircuit or
intercircuit inconsistency, it still does not follow that Congress should
refuse to create them. The logical leap from newjudgeships-increaseinconsistency to create-no-new-judgeships is vulnerable to a powerful
reduction ad absurdum attack. If consistency is the paramount goal of
the judicial process, and fewer judgeships mean more consistency,
Congress should reduce the number of authorized judgeships. At the
very least, Congress should not have increased judgeships from the
1960 total of sixty eight to the current total of 179. Yet the consequences of such a zero-growth policy would have been disastrous. Today the circuit courts can keep current by giving full appellate process
(oral argument, conference, and published, judge-authored opinion)
to only half their caseload; the remainder get no argument, no conference, and a cursory, unpublished opinion drafted by staff attorneys. If
Congress had stood pat at the 1960 level of sixty-eightjudgeships, only
20% of today's appellate cases would receive the traditional appellate
process, and 80% would be handled bureaucratically. To push the
absurdity even further, if fewer judgeships mean greater consistency,
why not have a single three-judge panel for the nation? That option
would eliminate all uncertainty.
The answer, of course, is that consistency is not the only goal. At
least as important as consistency is adequate capacity. The system
needs enough judges not only to decide the cases carefully and correctly, but also to convince the litigants, the bar, and the public that
each case gets the personal attention and reasoned deliberation of
Article III judges. Thus, even if we assume (counter-factually) that
expansion generates inconsistency, we have proved only that adequate
capacity on the one hand and legal consistency on the other are competing values that must be balanced against each other, not that
judgeships should be frozen at current levels.
Where then to strike the balance? In order to answer that question, we would need to know much more than we now know (or even
presume to know) about the relationship between additional judge-
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ships and legal inconsistency. Is there a straight-line correlation, with
consistency decreasing proportionately to the number of new judges,
or are there gradual slopes and sudden drop-offs in the curve? It is
crucial to know the answer in order to generate the maximum
amount of both consistency and capacity. Otherwise, there is no reason to prefer one balance of the competing goals over another. The
current balance of having enough judges to give traditional appellate
process only to cases involving interesting issues, high economic
stakes, or powerful parties seems to satisfy the judges, but without
much more data, we cannot defend it as an optimal tradeoff between
capacity and consistency.
In the absence of data on the purported correlation, the issue
turns on the burden of proof. Should that burden fall on the proponents or opponents of additional judgeships? Two arguments show
that the burden belongs on the opponents. The first of these arguments is based on the difference between known versus unknown
costs and benefits. In this case, the known benefit is the traditional
appellate process. Traditional appellate process made the federal appellate courts great; the courts flourished because the judges did their
own work.201 From the earliest days, federal appellate judges heard
oral argument, conferred with each other, and gave reasons (oral or
written) for their decisions. These reasoned decisions then served as
precedent in later cases. This traditional process persisted until the
1960s when the increases in caseload began to outstrip the growth in
judgeships. Although the courts were able to compensate by becoming more bureaucratic, no one argues that bureaucratic appellate justice is intrinsically better than the traditional model. Accordingly, the
burden of proof on the inconsistency/capacity tradeoff belongs on
those who would make permanent the change from the traditional to
the bureaucratic model. We ought not give up the proven benefits of
the Learned Hand model without a very good reason. Avoiding losses
in certainty and consistency might qualify as a good reason if we could
be sure they would occur and we could know their orders of magnitude. It makes no sense, however, to suffer the known evil of increased bureaucratization in return for a dividend of increased
consistency that is completely speculative in amount and proportion.

201

See, e.g., CHARI.ES E. WYZANs,

JR., WHEREAs-AJUDGE'S PREMISES (1965).

When Brandeis understood all that there was to know about the facts, he
himsef... prepared his own statement of his findings and conclusions. I
will remember a remark ajustice made to me when I first entered the public service: "The reason the public thinks so much of the justices of the
Supreme Court is that they are almost the only people in Washington who
do their own work."
Id at 61.
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The second reason that the burden of proof should fall on the
opponents of additional judgeships concerns notions of distributive
justice. Distributive justice deals with the allocation of costs and benefits among members of society. 20 2 Appellate justice, a societal benefit,
is not distributed evenly under the current two-track system of appellate review. Wealthy, powerful, institutional, and governmental litigants get far more of the judges' time and attention than do other
litigants. 20 3 Favoring consistency over capacity by restricting the
number of new judgeships will increase that discrepancy.
Because "important" litigants are much more likely to spread out
their operations geographically and to make repeated use over time of
the appellate system, gains in consistency are very important to them.
Consistency does not loom so large, however, for other more local,
one-time litigants. Gains in capacity, on the other hand, favor poorer,
weaker litigants because additional judgeships will increase their
chances of receiving the personal attention of Article III judges.
Favoring consistency over capacity by limiting the number of
judges thus sacrifices the interests of weaker litigants in favor of the
interests of more powerful litigants, who already receive a disproportionate share of society's appellate resources. The current system of
rationing appellate justice already favors wealthy and powerful litigants because their cases are less likely to be "screened" out of the
traditional appellate process and handled via the track-two method.
Restricting judicial expansion merely exacerbates the current distributional discrepancy, and thus violates fundamental democratic values.
2 04

c. Methods for Increasing Consistency

If we assume both that creating more judgeships leads to inconsistency 20 5 and that legal consistency is our appellate system's paramount value, 20 6 then it would seem to follow that Congress should not
supply the new positions. But that conclusion is not inevitable even
with those counterfactual assumptions; there are ways to safeguard
consistency without permanently limiting the nation's appellate capacity. Thus, a sensible response to the Federal Courts Study Committee's concern about "so many uncoordinated opinions from so many
judges" 207 is to supply some additional coordination. The coordinating devices can be divided into those that avoid inconsistency and
those that resolve it.
202
203
204
205
206
207

R.W.M. DIAs, JURISPRUDENCE 66 (4th ed. 1976).

See supra part I.C.
See generally BAKER, supra note 13, at 224-27; McKENNA,

supra note 3, at 91-92.

But see supra part Ill.B.3.a.
But see supra part III.B.3.b.
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 112, at 114. The Report

does not explain how our current system "coordinates" cases.
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i. Better Legislation

Among the easiest ways to avoid inconsistency is to cut it off at its
legislative source. The courts of appeals devote substantial time and
effort to litigation dealing with issues of statutory construction. Statutes can be unclear or ambiguous for a variety of reasons. Sometimes
the ambiguity is an intentional political compromise, but just as often
it results from poor drafting and lack of foresight.208 Congress could
short-circuit these ambiguities before they produced inconsistent interpretations in the courts. As certain as death and taxes, for instance,
is litigation to determine whether a new statute should apply retroactively, whether it should preempt state law, whether a private right of
action is intended, and what the appropriate limitations period
should be. These issues, as well as many others, turn entirely on legislative intent, and Congress could forestall later litigation by resolving
them at the outset. To promote this development, the Federal Court
Study Committee prepared a checklist of statutory construction issues
for use by Congressional Committee staffs and the Office of Legislative Counsel in the House and Senate. 20 9 A further step toward coordination would be the creation of a "second look" Congressional
committee or office to review the progress of new legislation in the
courts. The goal would be to identify litigated issues that result from
ambiguity or poor drafting and to resolve them in subsequent correc210
tive legislation.
208 An example of this sort of poor legislative drafting is 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994). The
SupplementalJurisdiction Statute was designed to codify the results of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), and Owen Equip. and Erection Corp. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.
365 (1978), and also to overrule both Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), and
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). The idea was to permit pendent claim and pendent party jurisdiction in federal question cases but not to permit the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction to diminish the complete diversity requirement. Unfortunately, when
Congress drafted § 1367 it specifically mentioned FED. R. CiM. P. 14, 19, and 20, but omitted FED. R. Crv. P. 23, probably through inadvertence. The literal language of the statute
effectively overrules Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), and Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), which had required that each claimant in a Rule 23(b) (3) diversity class action separately meet the amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332; Congress probably did not intend to overrule Snyder and Zahn. For a discussion of
the issue, see GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CiviL PROCEDURE
140-41 (2d ed. 1994).
209 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 112, at 91.
210
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A PleaforL g lative Revkw, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 995, 1012
(1987); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committe, 100 HAV. L.
REv. 1417 (1987). Both BAKER, supranote 13, at 224-27 and MCKENA, supranote 3, at 92,
review this proposal. A pilot project exists in the D.C., First, Third, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits, whereby staff attorneys review slip opinions for those cases involving statutes
whose drafting glitches have produced troublesome issues of Congressional intent. The
court reviews these cases and selects the most appropriate ones to be forwarded to the
appropriate congressional offices and committees. See BAKER, supranote 13, at 225-26.
Another way to cut off inconsistency at its source is to clean up judicial opinions.
Voices within the courts have begun to notice that opinions are growing longer, more
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Better Communication

Another relatively cost-free mechanism to limit inconsistency is to
increase communication among circuit judges. The job of a circuit
judge is a lonely one. Most judges are geographically isolated with
few, if any, colleagues in the same city.2 1' Apart from sitting together
on three-judge panels and meeting at circuit conferences, their communication is spotty and haphazard.2 1 2 In some circuits, however,
they have begun to increase the use of coordinated communication to
avoid inconsistent holdings and dicta. The Ninth Circuit has been a
pioneer. Like all circuit courts, the Ninth has an en banc process to
resolve intercircuit conflicts and a "first panel" rule, which provides
that the first panel decision of an issue binds later panels unless overturned by an en banc decision.2 1 3
The Ninth Circuit has adopted an additional set of procedures to
avoid inconsistency. 2 14 In the first step, staff attorneys "inventory" the
case according to detailed issue codes and feed the information into a
computer. When possible, cases raising the same issues are then assigned to a single three-judge panel. If that is not possible, panels
hearing cases raising the same issue are so informed and a priority-ofsubmission rule controls; the panel to whom the issue was first submitted has priority, and other panels must await the outcome and follow
the precedent established by the first panel. 21 5 The second step,
which occurs after the filing of the opinion, also involves both judges
and staff. The panel circulates its opinion to off-panel judges who
have three weeks to communicate with panel members. At the court's
direction, the staff reviews all published opinions for potential conflicts and can suggest modifications to preserve consistent circuit law.

prolix, and overloaded with dicta and string citations. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 44, at
108-09. Poorly thought-out and extraneous dicta, general propositions quoted out of context, and needless rehearsals of basic propositions increase the likelihood of error and the
likelihood of disagreement with the extraneous language contained in other opinions; this
leads to the appearance of incoherence in the law. Ironically, ifJudge Posner is correct in
ascribing this deterioration ofjudicial opinion writing to the proliferation of law clerks, the
courts have created a perpetual motion machine: more clerks are needed to deal with the
inconsistencies created by more clerks.
211
See Wasby, supra note 71, at 585. Notable exceptions are the D.C. and Federal Circuits, all of whose members sit in the same city.
212
I& at 586-92.
213
HELLMAN, RESTRUCTURINGJUSTICE, supranote 173, at 56.
214 See id. at 58-62; JOE S. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE
COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECr 8-9 (1985); Stephen L. Wasby, Communication in the Ninth Circuit: A Concernfor Collegiality, 11 U. PUGEr SOUND L. REV. 73, 113-18
(1987).
215
HELLMAN, RESTRUCTURINGJUSTICE, supra note 173, at 58-59.
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216
Specialized Courts, Specialized Panels

If the morejudges-means-greater-inconsistency' thesis is correct,
subject-matter specialized courts or panels can help avoid inconsistency by reducing the number of precedential decision makers in a
particular area of law. Specialized subject-matter courts are courts of
nation-wide jurisdiction over particular types of appeals staffed by a
stable corps ofjudges. Examples in this country are the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 21 7 the Temporary Emergency Court of
21 9 In other systems, speAppeals, 218 and the Court of Military Appeals.
220
cialized appellate courts are the rule, rather than the exception.
Specialized panels, by contrast, would be subdivisions of the existing
regional courts of appeals, 221 staffed by judges of the regional circuit
who rotate through subject matter areas for terms of two to five years.
In a large court like the Ninth Circuit, for example, the cases could be
five major areas, with each area handivided up by subject matter into
222
dled by a panel of six judges.
The literature on specialized courts and panels is extensive; see, e.g., PAUL D.
(1976); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in
Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and
(1991);
329
REv.
L.
AdministrativeLaw, 43 ADMIN.
the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the NationalLaw, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 542 (1969); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1989); Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57
HARv. L. REv. 1153 (1944); Clement F. Haynsworth, Improving the Handlingof Criminal Cases
in the FederalAppellate System, 59 CORtNELL L. REv. 597 (1974); Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized
Courts: A Choic4 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 745 (1981).
217 28 U.S.C. § 1295. See generally Dreyfus, supra note 216 (treating the Federal Circuit's history and current record in detail).
218 Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743, 748-50 (1971).
10 U.S.C. § 867 (1994).
219
See genera/ly Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Re220
giona Design of the U. S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L REv. 603, 610 (1989) [hereinafter
judicialArchitecture] (describing Pennsylvania system); DanielJ. Meador, An Appellate Court
216

CA RINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL

Dilemma And a Solution Through Subject MatterJurisdiction, 16 MICH. J. L. REV. 471, 475-76

(1983) [hereinafter An Appellate CourtDilemma] (describing German and English systems).
Our federal system has a prejudice against de jure subject matter appellate courts,
although such courts exist defacto. For instance, in 1987, the Second Circuit had 41 appeals in securities cases brought by the government, while four circuits had none; the Fifth
Circuit had 180 marine injury appeals, while three circuits had none; the Ninth Circuit had
31 appeals in environmental cases against the government, while three circuits had only
one each. MeadorJudicialArchitecture,supra,at 614. Yet another form of defacto specialization exists in the federal appellate system. One set of courts, composed exclusively of Article III circuit judges, hears cases involving important issues, difficult legal questions, and
wealthy litigants. Another set of courts, composed largely of young staff attorneys, handles
repetitive, fact-specific appeals brought by poor litigants.
There is one example of a specialized panel on a regional court in the federal
221
system. In'the Fifth Circuit, oil and gas cases are assigned to a special panel of several
judges who have developed expertise in the area. See Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma,
supra note 220, at 477.
See id. at 489-90 (describing a sample plan for subject-matter panels on the Ninth
222
Circuit).
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The advantages of specialized panels and courts are expertise, efficiency, and, most important for our purposes, consistency. Judges
working in a particular area of the law learn that area well and can
supply expert interpretation of the relevant statutes, case law, and policies. Those judges work more efficiently and quickly because they do
not need to learn the elementary principles of an unfamiliar subject
for each new case on the docket. If the growth and inconsistency hypothesis is correct, however, the greatest advantage of specialized
panels and courts, would be gains in consistency. The use of relatively
few decision makers means that opportunities for inconsistent holdings would be minimized and also that members of the bar could rely
on a known and predictable bench. Specialized courts and panels
thus combine the capacity of a large judiciary with the consistency and
coherence of a much smaller one.
Opponents of increasing federal appellate capacity through specialization 2 23 cite the dangers of capture, tunnel vision, boredom, and
loss of prestige.2 24 A little care, however, in the design of the subjectmatter division can avoid these pitfalls. For specialized courts, the key
is to resist excessively narrow jurisdictional grants. As long as a court
has jurisdiction over different types of cases arising in different social
contexts, it runs little risk of the traditional specialization woes. 2 25
The response is even easier for specialized panels. Establishing only a
few divisions per circuit assures each panel a fairly wide range of cases,
and relatively short rotation periods minimize the risks of capture,
lobbying, tunnel vision, and boredom. 226
iv.

Resolving Inconsistency-StructuralReform

Thus far, we have concentrated on methods to avoid the inconsistencies that supposedly accompany increases in appellate capacity.
Another possibility is to resolve the alleged increases in inconsistencies
223 See, e.g., ABA
note 115, at 34-35.

224

REPORT,

supra note 8, at 532-40; PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra

According to the opponents of federal appellate specialization, a highly specialized

court risks capture because its judges become familiar with the specialized practitioners
that routinely practice before it. Further, because its decisions are so important to repeat
litigants, appointments to the court provoke extreme lobbying efforts. The problem of
tunnel vision occurs when judges see only one particular type of case; they thus lose their

perspective as generalists, develop their own jargon and become accessible only to specialists in the bar. Finally, boredom and lack of prestige, which result from repetitive litigation
before the court, ultimately make it difficult to find high quality nominees.
For a discussion of these issues see Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma, supra note 220,

at 482-84. The classic example of a court which succumbed to all of these difficulties is the
Commerce Court. Its brief and sad history is discussed in Bruff, supranote 216, at 335-36.
225 See Bruff, supra note 216, at 341-42; Meador, An Appellate CourtDilemma, supra note
220, at 483; Meador, JudicialArchitecture supra note 220, at 632-40.
226 A plausible plan appears in Meador, An Appellate CourtDilemma, supra note 220, at
489-90.
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once they appear. That strategy requires, in one form or another, an
additional tier in the appellate process. With another level of courts
to resolve intercircuit inconsistency, more circuits could be created,
allowing each of the circuit courts to remain small enough to minimize intracircuit inconsistency. Further, the resulting pyramidal
structure makes sense in light of the dual function of intermediate
appellate courts. Error correction requires steadily increasing judgeships as caseloads rise. But, according to the more-judges-createsinconsistency argument, coherent law declaration requires fewer
judgeships. The pyramid meets both needs with a relatively broad
base to maximize error correction capacity and a smaller upper tier to
2 27
focus law declaration.
One serious disadvantage attends any plan to create an additional
tier of appellate courts. 228 A fourth layer of courts means additional
expense and delay for the litigants; there would be one more round of
227 Several different configurations are possible. The Hruska Commission suggested a
single national court of appeals staffed by seven or nine life-tenure, Article m judges appointed specifically to the court. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System, Structure andInternal Procedures:RecommendationsforChange, in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975).
Another basic model would staff a single national court with judges from the existing circuit courts sitting for relatively short (2-3 year) rotating terms. Federal Judicial Center,

Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Cour4 in 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972). See also
BARER, supranote 13, at 253-56 (describing the "In Banc Intercircuit Conference"); Warren
E. Burger, AnnualReport on the State of theJudiary,66 A.B.J. 442 (1983) (recommending
an "Intercircuit Panel"). Yet another configuration would consist of three or four sevenjudge super-circuits; each responsible for reviewing five or six circuit courts, which, in turn,
would be staffed by nine or ten judges each. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COM-

MrEE, supra note 112, at 119-20. Thejudges of the super circuit courts might be specially
appointed for life terms or be recruited for rotating terms from among the judges of the
circuit courts. For a discussion of this variation, see McKENNA, supra note 3, at 117-21.
Regardless of the configuration of the new court(s), a host of functional issues would
arise. Would the court sit in panels or en banc; and, if it sat in panels, would there be
provision for en bane re-hearings? What would be the precedential effect of the decisions
of the court(s) and how would the Supreme Court review those decisions? Could the new
court overrule itself. Jurisdiction might be by discretionary, or in some cases mandatory,
appeal from the circuit courts, by transfer from the circuit courts, or by referral from the
Supreme Court. It could encompass all federal questions, or instead, focus only on issues
in which intercircuit conflicts exist. A functioning plan would require a decision on each
of these issues and probably several more as well.
228 Two additional disadvantages have also been raised. First, the appointment process
could cause a political headache. If a single president appointed all members of the new
court, opposition party legislators might object and retard confirmation. Relatively easy
solutions to this political problem exist, however. Appointments could be staggered or,
better yet, appointment could be made automatic by seniority among currentjudges (perhaps subject to executive or legislative veto).
The second objection is that creation of a higher national tribunal will reduce the
prestige of the existing circuitjudges. Indeed, opinion surveys show overwhelming opposition fromjudges. See MCKENNA, supranote 3, at 121. Opposition based on worries about
prestige should count for nothing. Courts exist for the benefit of the nation, not the satisfaction of the judges. In the words ofJudge Haynsworth:
[T]hat kind of concern for personal prestige, or the prestige of one's office,
can not be permitted to preclude accretions to the system which are neces-
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briefing, one more round of argument, and months more waiting
before final resolution of the case. There are, however, ways to minimize this impact. For instance, some cases could bypass the circuit
court level. Thus, if the district judge or the circuit panel certified
that the case raised an intercircuit conflict or some other issue likely
to require national law making, the case could proceed directly to the
national appellate level. Another time-saving measure would be to
consolidate briefing on petitions for discretionary review. If the national appellate court declined discretionary review, the submissions
to that court would serve as the materials the Supreme Court would
review for certiorari. In a four-tier system, it might be difficult to eliminate entirely additional delay and expense to the parties, but measures like those suggested could diminish the extra burden
substantially.
v.

Tradition,Proportion, and Inevitability

In order to use specialization or a four-tier pyramid to combat the
inconsistency that supposedly results from increased appellate capacity, several cherished traditions of American appellate justice must be
abandoned. Any configuration for increasing capacity means abandoning the tradition of a small elite federal judiciary, and increased
use of specialized courts or panels trenches on the historical role of
federal judges as generalists. A four-tier system changes the traditional judicial hierarchy, as well as the practice of allowing conflicts to
"percolate" before they reach the Supreme Court. Additionally, significant increases in the number of circuits, a necessary element of a
four-tier system, inevitably would violate the traditional convention of
circuit alignment (having at least three contiguous states per circuit)
and eventually might require splitting a single state between two
circuits.
As comforting and familiar as these traditions are, however, they
are also peripheral. Historically, the central, defining characteristic of
the federal appellate courts was that the judges did their own high
quality work. Each case received the personal attention of Article III
judges; courts did not "screen" cases or ration justice according to the
wealth, power, or prominence of the litigants. That defining characteristic, of course, is in serious jeopardy. Subject-matter specialization
or a four-tier system could restore this defining characteristic by permitting substantial growth in capacity while retaining legal coherence.
sary to its efficient functioning... [A]ny reluctance on my part to look up
to sixteen judges above me rather than nine should carry little weight.
Letter from the Honorable Clement F. Haynsworth to A. Leo Levin (April 30, 1975), in 2
HeaningsBefore the Commission on Revision of the FederalCourtAppellate System, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1327, 1328 (1975) quoted in BAKER, supra note 13, at 251.
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If the cost of saving the system's defining characteristic is the abandonment of some peripheral traditions, the price may be high, but it
is certainly a worthwhile exchange.
Further, if the morejudges-means-greater-incoherence thesis is
correct, the loss of the peripheral traditions is inevitable anyway. Because Congress is not going to reduce federal jurisdiction substantially, caseloads will continue to rise. As they do, the system will seek
to accommodate them in one of two ways. First, it could keep the
number ofjudgeships relatively low and increase the use of screening
and triage to keep pace. There are, however, political limits to that
solution. At some point Congress, the bench, the bar, and the public
will rebel. Those constituencies remained relatively docile as the
courts increased to fifty percent the portion of cases screened out of
the traditional appellate process. But will they remain silent as the
percentage rises to sixty or seventy-five or ninety percent?
If not, the only alternative will be to increase the number of
judgeships. But then, if the growth and inconsistency hypothesis is
correct, the law within and among circuits will become incoherent,
and structural change-specialization or a fourth tier-will be required anyway. In the end, both the peripheral and the central traditions of the federal appellate system will be lost. If structural
modifications are required to accommodate capacity and consistency,
it would be much wiser to make them now while the central value of
the system can still be saved.
4. Reduced Collegiality
Adding judges, it is sometimes argued, would reduce collegiality,
thereby impairing judicial quality. Little detail accompanies this objection, and for good reason. "Collegiality" evokes a picture of a small
number ofjudges gathered in a library, sipping sherry and discussing
their cases. Reality is quite different; judicial collegiality in that sense
appears to be a myth. One study of the Eighth Circuit, for example,
found that even among judges on a particular panel, "the memoran2 29
dum was the most frequently used means of communication."
Communication with off-panel judges was "not extensive,"2 30 and
communication involving track-two cases is nearly non-existent because they usually involve no conference or, at best, a mass conference
at which between thirty and fifty cases are treated in each session.
Moreover, the court rarely meets as a group, and individual judges are
231
reluctant to relocate their chambers to circuit headquarters.
229

230
231

Washy, supra note 71, at 589.
Id
Id- at 603-04.
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The findings of this study are particularly instructive because they
describe the workings of a small court-the Eighth Circuit had ten
active judges at the time of the study.23 2 Given judicial perceptions
that the number ofjudges on a court somehow adversely affects communication, 23 3 the low level of communication in the Eighth Circuit
comes as something of a surprise. However, the Eighth Circuit's experience is quite typical. Chief'Justice Rehnquist has commented on the
lack of real interchange at conferences or otherwise, 23 4 and Chief
Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit has made the same observation.23 5
Both comments are telling. Rehnquist and Wald sit on relatively
small, geographically compact courts, 23 6 and the Supreme Court (of
course) does not even sit in panels. If collegiality does not exist on
those courts, it surely does not exist anywhere.
Even if collegiality were not a myth, it is difficult to see why it
should be valued so highly. Perhaps a collegial court can operate
more efficiently. If panel members know the jurisprudential views
and work styles of their fellow judges from previous cases, perhaps
they can spend less time getting acquainted and proceed to productive work more quickly. They can also be more productive if they
don't waste time squabbling.
But collegiality entails a cost. Judges who know, like, and depend
on each other might be less likely to risk their relationship by disagreeing on matters of importance to one or the other. Over time,
colleagues might accumulate debts of deference on key issues, and
subtle, unarticulated vote trading could occur. A "don't-rock-theboat" mentality might pervade the courts. Of course collegiality does
provide one clear benefit: professional life on a collegial court is
more pleasant for the judges. The courts, however, exist for the good
of the nation, not the professional satisfaction of the judges.
Even if collegiality were a palpable public benefit, it is by no
means clear that collegiality is a function of small size. A small court is
not necessarily a happy one, as famous feuds on the Supreme Court

232
233

Id. at 585.
Id. at 602.

234
See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 294-95
(1987).
235 Patricia M. Wald, Some Real-Life ObserationsAboutJudging,26 IND. L. REv. 173, 178

(1992) ("What do we not spend our time doing? Talking or discussing cases with our
colleagues.").
236 Even on the smallest of courts, cohesion is difficult to achieve if only for geographic reasons. On Learned Hand's Second Circuit, for example, "three of its six members... did not live in New York and were commuters.... The physical dispersal...
precluded their coalescing into a closely knit social group." SCHICK, supranote 14, at 74.
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attest;23 7 and some quite large bodies are very collegial.23 8 Today, increases in size might well make the courts more collegial. For one
thing, the workload would become more manageable, leaving more
time for traditional collegial decision making. Also, personal feuds
could be buried in the anonymity of a larger group. Further, if there
were more active circuit judges, there would be less need for visiting
judges and central staff, and encounters among active circuit judges
on threejudge panels would be more, rather than less, frequent.2 3 9
5. JurisdictionalRetrenchment: Throwing Out the Baby to Save the
Bath Water
Advocates of a small, elite federal judiciary have their own solution to the problem of appellate overload-jurisdictional contraction.
According to these advocates, if Congress would just return federal
jurisdiction to the proper, limited scope prescribed by the Constitution, history, and federalism, the caseload of the federal courts would
decrease enormously, and there would be no need for significant expansion of the judiciary. 240 The Constitution, the argument goes,
contemplates a very limited role for the federal courts, and the jurisdictional statutes, at least until recently, confirm that role.2 4 ' Continued expansion of federal jurisdiction subverts the historic role of the
federal courts and usurps the powers of the state judiciaries. 24 2 Expanding federal jurisdiction into areas of only marginal or insubstantial federal interest makes the courts less able to handle their
traditional workload-major litigation involving significant national
interests.2 43 Most important (so the argument goes), the growth of
federal jurisdiction has caused the massive expansion of the federal
judiciary, which threatens to alter its basic character. Reversing the
expansion of federal jurisdiction would therefore remove the need for
even greater and even more damaging judicial expansion.
237

E.g., the famousJackson/Black feud discussed in THE OXFORD

COMPANION TO THE

eds., 1992).
238 E.g., the United States Senate, fire departments, and most law faculties.
239 See discussion supra part I.C. Judge Posner makes this same point with respect to
visitingjudges. POSNER, supra note 44, at 106. Judicial expansion might actually enhance
collegiality in small cities like Omaha or Birmingham where the number of circuit judges
would increase, but still remain quite small.
240 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 19.
241 FEDERAUZATION, supra note 129, at 10-11, 14-15; MORATORIUM, supra note 126, at
26-27.
242 See FEDERALIZATION, supra note 129, at 17-26; William H. Rehnquist, Wekoming Remarks: National Conference on State-FederalJudicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REv. 1657, 1660
(1992).
243 FEDERAUZATION, supra note 129, at 21; PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115,
at 19.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 445 (Kermit L. Hall et al.
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Supporters of court-capping have proposed a variety of plans to
contract the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 244 but two themes
predominate. The first is an inventory of types of cases that should be
eliminated. Thus, for example, the Federal Courts Study Committee
recommended that Congress curtail diversity jurisdiction, (leaving
only complex multi-district litigation, interpleader, and suits involving
aliens),245 prohibit removal of low dollar amount ERISA cases, 246 require state prisoner civil rights plaintiffs to exhaust state institutional
remedies, 247 consider recommendations for revising habeas corpus jurisdiction, 248 shunt review of social security disability claims to a new
Article I Court of Disability Claims, 249 authorize the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to arbitrate employment discrimination cases with the parties' consent, 250 and repeal the Federal
Employee's Liability Act and the Jones Act, leaving the claims of injured workers to state and federal workers compensation systems.2 1
The second theme is a generalized admonition to Congress to
stop "federalizing" the civil and criminal law. According to this line of
reasoning, federal law should not duplicate state law; when state law
already provides civil and criminal remedies, Congress should resist
the constant temptation to try to solve the nation's social and political
problems with federal legislation enforced through federal courtjurisdiction.2 52 Thus, the Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States proposed that federal criminal
jurisdiction be limited to offenses against the federal government,
criminal activity with substantial interstate or international aspects, sophisticated criminal enterprises requiring federal prosecutorial resources, serious high-level or widespread state or local government
244 See, e.g., PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 19-32; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMr-EE, supra note 112, at 35-67; Charles Clark, Mules and Wag-

ons-A PleaforJurisdictionalReform, 14 Miss. C. L. RFv. 263, 266 (1994);Jon 0. Newman,
RestruturingFederalJurinsdiction:Proposals to Preserve the FederalJudicialSystem, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 761, 770-76 (1989). Proposals to save the federal courts by restricting theirjurisdiction are not a new phenomenon. See HenryJ. Friendly, Averting the Flood By Lessening the

Flow, 59

CORNELL L. REv. 634 (1974).
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrITEE,

supra note 112, at 38; see also

PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 25.
246 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE,

supra note 112, at 43; see also

PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supranote 115, at 29.
247 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE,

supra note 112,

245

249

Id. at 51.
Id. at 55; see also PROPOSED

250

REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE,

251

Id. at 62-63; see also PROPOSED LONG

248

at

48-49.

supra note 115, at 27-28.
supra note 112, at 60-61.
PLAN, supranote 115, at 29. Reliance on

LONG RANGE PLAN,
RANGE

the EEOC is particularly cynical, given its huge and growing backlog. See, e.g., Peter T.

Kilborn, Backlog of Cases is OverwhelmingJobs-BiasAgency, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1994, at A6.
252
See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 19-32.
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corruption, and criminal cases raising highly sensitive local issues. 253
The same committee proposed that federal civil jurisdiction be limited to cases arising under the Constitution, matters involving foreign
relations, actions involving the federal government, disputes between
states, substantial interstate or international disputes, and matters re254
quiring a nationally uniform rule.
The jurisdictional retrenchment argument, however, like the rest
of the court-capping rhetoric, is seriously flawed.
a. Power and History
Without saying so directly, the jurisdictional retrenchment argument suggests that some Constitutional impropriety results if Congress expands the scope of the federal courts' civil and criminal
jurisdiction toward the limits in Article 111.255 That suggestion is simply wrong. It is a matter of black-letter law that Congress has plenary
power over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and can assign
to them any matter described in Article 111.256 Article III is expansive,
including (among other jurisdictional grants) jurisdiction over cases
"arising under"257 the Constitution and federal statutes. Thus, the
only real constitutional restriction on the ability of Congress 258 to
253 Proponents of this argument deplore using federal legislation and jurisdiction as a
major part of the war on drugs, the attempt to control firearms, or the campaign to reduce
violence against women. See Rehnquist, supra note 242, at 1660. "Judicial federalism" re-

fers to restraint in assigning the full measure of Article lIjurisdiction to the federal courts;
"legislative federalism" refers to Congressional restraint in using its full power under the
Commerce Clause. See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 19.
254

PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 23-29.

255 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, gives judicial power to the federal government over "all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made... under their Authority" and to "Controversies... between Citizens of
different States."
256 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIGTION 202 (2d ed. 1994); CHARLES A.
WuGu-r, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 35 (4th ed. 1983). There may be limits on congressional

power to restrictthe jurisdiction of the federal courts-particularly if it does so in violation
of other constitutional provisions. See CHEMERINS Y,supa, at 196. For example, suppose a
jurisdictional statute restricting the rights of women to federal courts or one preventing
Supreme Court review of certain cases because of dissatisfaction with Supreme Court precedent. Such restrictions would clearly violate constitutional provisions. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506 (1869). For a discussion of the McCardle problem, see
Chemerinsky, supra, at 172-86.
257 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
258 Two proponents of a small, elite federal judiciary have recently suggested that if
Congress fails to exercise jurisdictional restraint, the federal courts could do so on their
own. See Robert M. Parker & LeslieJ. Hagin, Federal Courts at the Crossroads: Adapt orLose,
14 Miss. C. L. REv. 211, 239 (1994). Citing the federal courts' power to refuse to exercise
jurisdiction under the abstention and forum non conveniens doctrines, Parker and Hagin
argue that the courts have "unilateral, inherent powers" to restrict their own jurisdiction if
Congress will not control its excesses:
The development in the federal courts of relatively distinct abstention
doctrines illustrates especially well the inherent powers of the courts to re-
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"federalize" the civil and criminal law is the minimal limit found in
2 59
the Commerce Clause.

With the constitutional aspect removed, the jurisdictional retraction argument relies mainly on tradition. Historically, Congress has
not used the full measure of its Commerce Clause power, nor has it
assigned the full measure of Article IIIjurisdiction to the courts. But
tradition can change as congressional perceptions of national policy
change. Indeed, the reach of federal jurisdiction has repeatedly exspond to the excessive enlargement of federal court jurisdiction by Congress.... [C]lose attention to the basic principles infusing the abstention
doctrines illuminates that, should Congress continue to create "federal"
crimes and causes of action exceeding the bounds of federalism and federal
court adjudicative ability, the federal courts will have no choice but to concomitantly expand the exercise of their inherent, "abstention" powers-so
as to "check" the inefficient, Judiciary-subverting and federalism-thwarting
excesses of the Legislature.
Id. at 239 (footnotes omitted). Parker and Hagin's argument depends upon a very fundamental misunderstanding of congressional control over federal jurisdiction. There is a
lively debate among scholars over whether the courts should exercise all the jurisdiction
conferred by Congress or should abstain in a narrow range of cases. CompareMartin H.
Redish, Reassessing the Allocation ofJudicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal
Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REv. 1769, 1829 (1988) (arguing that
judicial abstention usurps congressional power) with David L Shapiro, Reflections on the
Allocation ofJurisdictionBetween State and Federal Courts: A Response to "Reassessingthe Allocation ofJudicialBusiness Between State and Federal Courts," 78 VA. L. REv. 1839, 1845 (1988)
(arguing that "history, tradition, and policy support the existence of limited judicial discretion ...

to refrain ... even when the existence ofjurisdiction is clear"). Supporters of the

Shapiro position can point to Supreme Court holdings on abstention. Sep, e.g., Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941). Forum non conveniens cases also support the Shapiro position. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
Nevertheless, no case has held and no commentator (except Parker and Hagin) has
argued that the courts could persist in refusing to exercise jurisdiction in the face of congressional insistence. Ultimate congressional control is assumed. See e.g., Shapiro, supra,
at 1845 ("[T]he legislature has the burden if it wishes to broaden or narrow the scope of
this discretion in a particular area."). One commentator goes so far as to suggest cooperative "dialogic" control, but stops well short of arguing for a "unilateral, inherent" power in
the courts to refrain wholesale. Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court,
Congress and FederalJurisdiction,85 Nw. U. L. R-v. 1 (1990).
Analysis of the abstention and forum non conveniens doctrine reveals the fundamental
error in the Parker-Hagin thesis. The doctrines clearly are not of constitutional stature;
either they are constructions ofjurisdictional statutes, or they are rules of federal common
law. Either way, Congress has the power to abolish or modify both doctrines, as it has done
with forum non conveniens. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1994). Thus, if the federal courts adopt
the Parker-Hagin thesis and refuse to hear "inappropriately federalized" actions, Congress
may nullify that refusal and insist that the courts hear the cases. No court or commentator
has ever stated that the courts could willfully refuse to hear matters within Article III in the
face of Congress's explicitjurisdictional command.
259 Until quite recently, there were no meaningful restrictions on congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). That
may be changing given the Court's recent holding in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995). Or it may be that Congress was sloppy in drafting the statute at issue in Lopez,
and its accompanying legislative findings, and that as long as Congress does not repeat the
error it will retain plenary Commerce Clause power.
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panded and contracted in response to changing congressional appraisals of the need for federal solutions to social, political, and

economic problems.26 0 In the end, the scope of federal jurisdiction
has hinged less on theory and tradition and more on politics and ex-

pedience. In the words of Professor Warren: "[T] he Federal judicial
system has not been a logical development on lines of consistent theory; it has been the product of temporary necessities and emergen-

cies, arising from both political, sectional, and economic conditions.
It has not been the embodiment of the theories of any particular
party .... ,,261
b. Reality and Politics
The thrust of the jurisdictional retrenchment argument is that
large expansions of the appellate judiciary will be unnecessary if Congress exercises proper jurisdictional restraint. Thus, the real issue in
the court-capping debate is not whetherjurisdictional retrenchment is
a good idea, but whether it is realistic to pin hopes of reducing federal
appellate caseloads on jurisdictional retrenchments. Given that Congress wields plenary power over federal jurisdiction, the only real
question is: will Congress do it?
The prospects for such a retrenchment are bleak, to say the least.
Even the most seemingly sensible federal jurisdiction reform proposals have a knack for prompting spirited opposition. Many of the Federal Courts Study Committee recommendations generated dissenting
statements within the Committee. The corporate bar, for instance,
opposed the abolition or restriction of diversity jurisdiction;26 2 organized labor objected to the repeal of the FELA;263 and the public interest bar opposed restrictions on § 1983 and habeas corpus claims by
state prison inmates. 2 64 As a result, few of the proposals have even
been introduced in Congress, let alone adopted.2 65 Further, even if
those controversial proposals were passed, they would not be an effec260
Perhaps the clearest illustration of this phenomenon is the fluctuation in criminal
filings in the federal district courts, which presumably provides a gauge of the federalization of criminal law. Filings have not increased in either a linear fashion or in direct proportion to population growth. The number of current filings Oust under 50,000), for
example, is about half of the all-time high reached during Prohibition, and roughly equal
to the number of filings in the early 1970s in spite of a major trough (less than 30,000) in
the early 1980s. See FEDERALIZATION, supra note 129, at 51 fig. 1; PROPOSED LONG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 115, at 7. As might be expected, "federalization" (and filings as a measure
of federalization) has risen and fallen in response to general fluctuations in the national
political perceptions of the appropriate balance between federal and state control.
261
Charles Warren, FederalCriminalLaws and the State Courts,38 HARv. L. REv. 545, 598
(1925).
262 See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE, supra note 112, at 4243.

263

1d. at 63-64.

264
265

Id. at 50-52.
In the words ofJustice (then ChiefJudge) Breyer:
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ive response to appellate overload. The Federal Courts Study Committee estimated that the combined effect of its recommendations
would decrease the caseload of the circuit courts by only about seventeen percent 266 A decrease of that magnitude would be wiped out by
only a few years of normal caseload growth. What then would be subtracted from the jurisdiction of the federal courts so that new appellate judgeships would not be required?
Specific technical jurisdictional proposals thus are not a realistic
substitute for expansion of the judiciary. But what of the more global
admonitions of the Long Range Planning Committee against continued federalization of the civil and criminal law?26 7 At least such proposals are of the right order of magnitude; if Congress vigorously
avoided new federalizations and phased out old ones, the resulting
reductions in caseloads could be large enough to forestall the need
for more judgeships. The probability that Congress will adopt such
global restraint, however, approaches zero. Congress "federalizes" the
civil or criminal law in response to powerful political forces, and the
vision of an elite federal judiciary, unsullied by cases based on improperly federalized crimes and civil claims, has no constituency large, numerous, or powerful enough to oppose groups that favor particular
federalizing legislation. On occasion, a brave and principled legislator will fall on her sword and sacrifice re-election over an important
principle, but how many will do so to protect the federal courts from
the growth that increasing federalization will require?
c.

Principle and Policy

The jurisdictional retrenchment argument is not only bad politics, it is bad policy as well. Its fundamental error is to misconceive the
function of federal jurisdiction. That jurisdiction exists for the good
of the country-not for the good of the federal courts. 2 68 If Congress
believes that "federalizing" some area of the law will benefit the country by controlling the drug problem, or by reducing firearm violence,
or by minimizing the victimization of some protected class, it is not
merely Congress's right, but Congress's duty to pass such legislaAll this is simply to say that the Committee may justifiably take credit for
having thought about and crafted its case removal provisions vwith care.
But, it would surprise me to find many of them enacted into law. If I am
right, a thoughtful effort having been made, it will be difficult to advocate
the door-closing solution to the federal appellate docket problem for some
time to come.
Breyer, supra note 8, at 87; see also Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting,39
EMORY L.J. 1, 48 (1996) (reducing either civil or criminal jurisdiction is not feasible as a
political matter).
266 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 27.
267
268

PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supranote 115, at 21, 24.
See MORATORIUM, supranote 126, at 41.
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tion, 2 69

even though it might discomfort the federal judges or require
270
additional judgeships.
The size of the task should control the size of the tool, not vice
versa. The jurisdictional retrenchment argument, however, reverses
this crucial priority. The argument starts with the premise of a small
elite federal judiciary and then reasons that, because of its size, the
judiciary should be allowed only a minimal core of federal jurisdiction. But surely Congress's job is to approach the problem from the
front end. It must first determine, in light of changing social conditions, how much federal legislation and federal jurisdiction the nation
needs. Then it must supply the federal courts with judgeships and
other resources equal to the task. There is no "natural,"27 1 or a priori,
proper size for any institution. An institution's function dictates its
appropriate form and size; and in our system the function of federal
jurisdiction is to benefit the nation, not the courts.
Another reason to discount the jurisdictional retrenchment argument is the strong classist and elitist themes that run through it. The
classism is most apparent in the argument's specific proposals to reduce federal jurisdiction. The Federal Courts Study Committee recommendations target diversity jurisdiction 2 72 (the suggestion is to
"virtually eliminate" diversity jurisdiction or to raise the amount in
controversy) ,27 3 ERISA cases (the proposal is to create a $10,000
amount in controversy requirement),274 prisoner civil rights litigation
(require exhaustion of state remedies),275 social security cases (divert
269
Provided, of course, that the proposed statute is within Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause, and that the proposed jurisdictional grant falls within Article III limits.
270 Similarly, if federal prosecutors believe that federal, rather than state, prosecution
of an offense would serve the national interest, they should prosecute, even though it

might increase the burden on the federal courts. Some members of the judiciary disagree
with this last point; the Judicial Conference Committee on Long Range Planning, for instance, recommends that "the potential for harsher federal sentencing policies and greater
capacity in the federal prisons should be insufficient grounds, by themselves, to warrant
prosecution under a federal, rather than a state criminal statute." PROPOSED LONG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 115, at 23. However, if federal prosecutors believe that stiffer federal
sentences and greater prison capacity can make law enforcement more efficient, the streets
safer, and citizens more satisfied with government, why should they forbear? Once again,
the goal of federal criminal law is the welfare of the citizenry-not the welfare of the courts
and the judges.
271
Clearly, members of the judicial establishment disagree: "[Wie may be approach-

ing the limits of the naturalgrowthof the federal courts, and yet the surge in case filings at
both the trial and especially the appellate level continues with no cessation in sight." REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE, supra note 112, at 8 (emphasis added).

Invoking the "nature" of an institution or equating what is "natural" with what is good is a
well-known and thoroughly discredited jurisprudential technique. See JEREMY BENTHAM,
THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 49-52 (Richard Hildreth trans., 1975).
272
See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 38.
273 Id. at 39.
274 Id. at 43.
275

Id. at 48.
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to an Article I court),276 employment discrimination suits (divert to
arbitration),277 and the FELA and Jones Act 278 (repeal). These cases
deal with the legal problems of the poorest and weakest of federal
court litigants, groups that federal courts once took great pride in
2 79
protecting.
The elitist theme is more apparent in court-capping rhetoric than
in specific provisions for reform. Proponents of jurisdictional retrenchment deplore wasting the time and energy of federal courts on
"small cases-against first time [drug] offenders or low-level runners," 280 and bemoan "an ever-increasing caseload with an ever-larger
percentage ...of relatively routine work which neither requires nor
engages the abilities of a first-rate judge."2 81 The deterioration of the
caseload, they fear, "will undoubtedly adversely affect our ability to
attract the people who have traditionally been drawn to this special
court,"282 and render the federal courts less effective as "forums for
the big case-major commercial litigation . . . and federal actions
283
under... laws regulating interstate commerce."
276

Id. at 55.

277

Id. at 60.

278 Id. at 62.
279 The cases that would be dropped from the scope of federal jurisdiction are, of
course, those cases that the courts of appeals currently relegate to track two appellate

justice.
280 Joseph R. Biden, Setting the Stage for the Nineties-Our Mutual Obligation, Address before the Third Circuit Judicial Conference (April 19, 1993), in FEDERAiSZATION,
supranote 129, at 30.
281 William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the American Bar Ass'n
(Aug. 9, 1976), in King, supra note 7, at 961. See alsoJones, supra note 2, at 1493.
[A]s the docket is "dumbed-down" by an overwhelming number of routine
or trivial appeals, judges become accustomed to seeking routine methods
of case disposition. Their mental and organizational flexibility, so vital for
performing the federal courts' classic tasks of defending the Constitution
and harmonizing federal law, inevitably suffers. The situation is like that of
a competitive tennis player forced to spend the bulk of his time rallying
with novices. Just as the player's competitive edge will erode from lack of
peer contact, so are judges' legal talents jeopardized by a steady diet of
minor appeals.
COURT ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 131, at 5.
283 Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks Before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 15, 1987), in FEDERALIZATION,
282

supra note 129, at 44 n.114.

The elitism of the jurisdictional retrenchment argument also appears in the proposed
destination for these trivial cases-the state courts. See Newman, supra note 244, at 768.

The idea seems to be that penny ante federal question cases, while unworthy of the federal
courts, are fine for the state courts. The problem, of course, is that the state courts are
even more overloaded than their federal counterparts. State courts handle 52 times the
caseload with only 15 times thejudges. See FEDERALIZATION, supra note 129, at 23 n.60. Nor
are the state court judges clamoring for the extra work or complaining that the federalizing of the civil and criminal law is usurping their prerogatives. The state court judges and
prosecutors welcome the help.
The response of the jurisdictional retrenchment proponents to the overloaded state
courts is that the state courts are "already geared to handle high volume." Newman, supra
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Working on low-status, low resource cases undoubtedly seems tedious and professionally unrewarding to many circuitjudges.28 4 Their
previous leadership positions in prestigious practice organizations and
in academia permitted them to shun such work, and they see no reason to take it up upon ascending to the bench. This may help to
note 129, at 194; see REPORT OF FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 4041. Removing 70,000 cases from the federal courts would decrease their caseload by 30%
while increasing state caseloads by only 1%. Proponents boldly assert that the states will
hardly notice! Justice (then Judge) Breyer points out correctly, however, the fallacy of that
contention:
The question is whether, now, in 1990, transferring several thousand cases
from federal courts to state courts will help the human beings who have
problems that translate into court litigation. It is difficult to see how the
transfer will help. The state courts also have resource problems, often, as in
Massachusetts, far more serious problems than those of federal courts in
the same region. To that extent one is simply robbing Peter to pay Paul.
And to suggest, as does the Committee, that the new, added burden on the
far larger state systems will go unnoticed, is a bit like arguing that a new
highway through Boston will cost less overall if we can convince federal,
rather than state, taxpayers to pay for it.
Breyer, supra note 8, at 35. Justice Breyer could have added that there is a profound arrogance in suggesting that the way to preserve the status of the federal courts and the professional satisfaction of federal judges is to add to the burdens of state courts andjudges who
are even more overworked and who enjoy lower status and less professional satisfaction.
The arrogance toward state court judges is schizophrenic, depending on the context.
When arguing that a larger federal judiciary would decline in quality because of inadequate attention paid to the appointments process, Judge Newman related the following:
I have seen the [weakness of the appointments process] ... at work in the
filling of vacancies in a large court-the state trial bench of Connecticut.
In a meeting of those with significant power over appointments, the name
of someone with dubious credentials is proposed. Even the assembled politicians express dismay. "You can't be serious," one tells the candidate's
sponsor. "Come off it," is the reply. "That court has 127 judges-they'll
never even notice him!" The appointment is made. Few notice. The episode has been repeated in many states.
The point should not be overstated. A federal judiciary of 3,000 to
4,000 would include some extremely able people and a large number of
competent people. But it would also include an unacceptable number of
mediocre and even a few unqualified people. Today, most observers regard
the overall quality of the federal judiciary as higher than that of the average state judiciary. At a size of 3,000 to 4,000, its quality would be indistinguishable from the most pedestrian of state judiciaries.
Newman, supra note 129, at 187-88. When arguing that federal question cases could be
diverted to state courts without harm, however, Newman saw a more worthy state judiciary:
[S]tate courts are now authorized, indeed required, to adjudicate a vast
array of claims arising under federal law, and they do so with considerable
skill and faithfulness to the commands of federal statutory and constitutional law. Admittedly, the pressures arising from the need to seek reelection and even to secure reappointment present a risk to courageous
decision making by state judges that federal judges enjoying life tenure do
not face. But state judges have not only competence, they have courage; it
would be a mistake to think that they would routinely be less protective of
federal rights than would federal judges.
Newman, supra note 244, at 769-70.
284 Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federa Courts, 7 OHIo ST. J. oN DisP.
RESOL. 115, 136 (1991).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:273

explain why opposition to expanding federal jurisdiction and the federal courts comes mostly from the judges themselves. 28 5 This limited
base of support for jurisdictional retrenchment, and the self-serving
motivation for that support should give Congress pause. Despite the
hubris of the court-capping rhetoric, the federal courts are not a work
of art to be appreciated aesthetically and to be protected from the
profane and trivial. Nor are they debating or learned societies that
exist to enhance the professional satisfaction of the judges. They are
instead a national resource-supported by all the taxpayers (including those with boring, routine federal claims)-that Congress should
deploy for the benefit of the nation. It may be that jurisdictional retrenchment is a good idea, but if so, it must be because of the good
consequences for the country, not because it will save the judges from
boring work or the federal courts from needed expansion.
IV
ELITISM
In the preceding pages, we have argued that judicial opposition
to increasing the number of appellate judges cannot be credibly based
upon concerns over doctrinal inconsistency, the quality of appointees,
or cost. We have also shown that opposition to expansion cannot rely
upon the prospect of jurisdictional contraction. This suggests that
other motives may form the true basis for judicial opposition to expansion of the federal judiciary. This part of the Article discusses
2 6
some of these possible motives.
A.

Familiarity

Even if it were possible, judges simply might not want to use the
Learned Hand model in all cases. Indeed, federal judges, hardly a
reticent group, seem to accept their new, "administrative" role readily.
No doubt part of this acceptance is due to a natural tendency to "view
as appropriate that which is familiar." 28 7 We believe, however, that a
more important consideration is that the process of the new certiorari
285
286

See FEDERALIZATION, supra note 129, at 22.
The REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 112, at 8, sug-

gested that a small federal judiciary "increases the likelihood that federal intervention will
be limited to those situations in which it is most clearly necessary." As Professor Robel has
pointed out, however, this argument assumes its conclusion; the argument assumes that
federal judicial "interference" in state affairs should be minimal. Robel, supranote 284, at
135. The decision of how much federal judicial involvement should be allowed in state
affairs, is, of course, one for Congress and the President to make. In any event, there is no
reason to assume that an enlarged judiciary, operating much more in the Learned Hand
model, would have the added leisure to "interfere" more aggressively in state affairs. Furthermore, it is always possible that today's too small judiciary may not interfere "enough."
287 Robel, supranote 21, at 55.
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courts permits the judges to replicate their role in private practice and
thus to avoid cases they view with distaste.
1. Replication
Most judges come from a background in practice in which they
acted as team leader rather than as solo practitioner. 28 8 A senior partner in today's average litigation practice has one or two junior partners, two or three associates, and any number of paralegals and
secretaries working under her direction. The job of the senior partner is to supervise-she does not perform the discovery, the research,
or the drafting except in the most important aspects of the most important cases. Those tasks are delegated to more junior lawyers, with
the senior partner checking only generally to see that the work is
done properly-and even most of the supervision is delegated (e.g.,
"Joe, did you go over Mary's research?"). The chambers of an appellate judge replicates that hierarchy. The judge (the senior partner)
delegates most of the work to personal clerks (junior partners) and
central staff (associates). Personal clerks review the work of staffers;
the judge reviews the work of personal clerks; and serious judicial in289
tervention is limited to the important cases.
The effect of replicating practice, however, goes beyond the administrative structure of chambers.2 90 Replication also insures that a
judge will treat most carefully those areas of the law which she knew
best in practice. Few judges had much experience as attorneys with
social security cases, prisoner petitions, or the routine problems of
small stakes litigants. On the other hand, most judges had a good
deal of experience with antitrust, securities, mass tort, or general business litigation while in private practice.2 9 1 This observation helps explain why the former set of cases is less likely to receive the Learned
Hand treatment.

288
It is difficult to determine the practice background of thejudges, primarily because
so many are now appointed from other judicial positions. See Sheldon Goldman, Bush's
JudicialLegacy:The Finallmprin, 76JuDicAruRE 282, 286-88 (1993). Of the 86 Bush federal

appointees who did not come from the judiciary, 38 (44%) came from law firms of at least
25 lawyers. Id. at 287 tbl. 2. The comparable figure for Reagan appointees is 28%. d. tbl.
2. See also POSNER, supra note 44, at 41 (stating that the average income of lawyers appointed to the federal bench in 1980 was $131,000, indicating successful legal practice).
289 Judge Wald was perhaps the first to notice this replicating effect. See Wald, supra
note 11, at 778.
290 A modem chambers also replicates, although less perfectly, the life of some law
professors.
291
Central staff, who do most of the work on the "lesser" cases, thus develop an expertise in those "mundane" matters. Becafise the judges do not share this expertise, judicial
deference to the work of the expert staff becomes even more likely.
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Distaste

The judicial pyramid also insures that judges do not have to
spend a lot of time on distasteful cases involving such matters as employee benefits or prisoner complaints. Anyone who talks to judges
knows they find those cases quite irksome. The vocation of a judge,
however, is to dojustice. Although it may be more interesting to read
briefs prepared by great lawyers in cases that will be written up in The
New York Times than it is to sift through pro se petitions, that should not
necessarily make those cases professionally more rewarding. After all,
a veteran's claim that the Government has improperly denied benefits
should have at least as strong an appeal to ajudge's sense ofjustice as
a claim by a Fortune 500 corporation that it is the target of an illegal
tender offer.
In real life, however, appellate judges prefer the notorious insider
trading case to the mundane and private world of prisoner complaints. Judge Rubin once wrote that "It]he desirability of being a
federal judge is inversely proportionate to the number of routine
cases brought to federal court... [t]he professional quality of those
who seek a federal judgeship is inevitably affected by the prestige, the
challenges and the responsibilities of being a federal judge."292 Judge
King has suggested that "UlIudges also resist more judges simply because mathematics dictates that as the size of the court increases, each
judge's chance of drawing an important case diminishes." 293 For
many judges, apparently, the lure of the job lies primarily in doing
their job in big cases. Judging in small cases, often brought by those
who claim they have been victimized by the Government, is far less
desirable.
B.

An Elite Judiciary

A clue as to what may really be driving some judicial opposition
can be gleaned from a recent article arguing against expansion of the
federal judiciary. Written by Chief Judge Tjoflat, the article's anecdotal and a priori argument rejects the position, taken by Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit, that problems associated with doubling the
size of the judiciary are soluble. Although Judge Reinhardt's argument is buttressed by statistical evidence and personal experience in a
large court, Judge Tjoflat ignores the evidence and dismisses Judge
Reinhardt's experience with his own jumbo court. Tjoflat writes:
Those who wish to create or maintain jumbo courts do so for a variety of reasons. Some are members of the jumbo court itself. The
court is their Edsel, so it's okay. Presumably, they believe that if
292
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they try hard enough to make the jumbo court work, it will work.
Unfortunately, the most determined elephant will never leap like a
gazelle.

2 94

This kind of public discourse is rare among members of the federal
bench and the language of Tjoflat's dismissal is quite instructive. Ob-.
viously, Judge Reinhardt struck an exposed nerve. Perhaps there is
more at stake here than an argument over efficiency. Perhaps concerns over quality of life are central to members of the judiciary who
oppose expansion. Judge Tjoflat writes that "life as a judge on a
jumbo court is comparable to life as a citizen in a big city-life on a
smaller court to life in a small town." 29 5 Thus, "judgesin small circuits
are able to interact with their colleagues in a more expedient and
efficient manner than judges on jumbo courts."2 96 Although this image is attractive, reality is somewhat different. As the earlier discussion
shows, interaction among judges seems to be quite minimal even on
relatively small courts like that ofJudge Tjoflat. The small town metaphor is also disturbing. It suggests thatjudges associate a "small town"
existence with comfort, and that Ninth Circuit type experience would
be less homey and less comfortable. But once again the comfort of
the judges is easily overvalued; courts exist for the good of the nation,
not for the satisfaction of the judges.
More is involved than comfort, however; status is also a serious
concern of opponents ofjudicial expansion. Status, however, usually
enters the debate through a side door. Advocates of a smaller judiciary sometimes couch their arguments in terms of a need to keep job
status high in order to attract quality applicants. The Federal Courts
Study Committee expressed it this way:
The independence secured to federal judges by Article nI is compatible with responsible and efficient performance ofjudicial duties
only if federal judges are carefully selected from a pool of competent and eager applicants and only if they are sufficiently few in
number to feel a personal stake in the consequences of their accan be satisfied if there are thousands of
tions. Neither condition
2 97
federal judges.
No data support the assertion that the judiciary will fail to attract quality candidates unless it remains a cozy, little group. Ajob as a federal
judge is very attractive for many reasons: public service, prestige, in-
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teresting colleagues and clerks, good pay and fringes, and perhaps of
most importance these days, much less pressure than is found in practice. In fact, judges generally do not leave the bench. Indeed,
"[a]lthough the absolute number of departures in the 1980s is large
...the rate of departure was actually lower than it was in all but three
other decades in the history of the federaljudiciary."2 98 There is thus
no lack of excellent candidates eager to take ajob as a federal judge.
Something other than concern over the applicant pool must be at
stake here.
When judges express concern over applicant quality, they really
seem to be saying: "I would not have become ajudge without the prestige associated with a small and elite body." Judge Wallace has written
that "the call to maintain a small and exclusive federal appellate judiciary has not come from the public, or even from the bar. This sentiment appears to be championed by federal judges, and I assume it is
rooted in a preference for a small-court culture." 299 Or, as thenProfessor Frankfurter wrote long ago: "A powerful judiciary implies a
relatively small number of judges."3 00 Others are even more explicit
about the relation among size, status, and power. Justice Scalia does
not want a larger judiciary: "It only dilutes the prestige of the office
and aggravates the problem of image."3 0 ' The themes of power, elitism, status, and image appear with distressing regularity.
The task of the federal courts, however, is not to provide status
and a comfortable life to the judges; but, instead, to bring justice to
our citizens. To quote Judge Wallace: "The federal courts do not exist for the benefit ofjudges. They exist... solely to serve and to meet
the needs of the public. Judges are, fundamentally, public servants.
Judiciary policy must be dictated by concerns for the judiciary's mission, not by the personal preferences of its members."3 0 2 Unfortunately, it is all too clear that concerns over comfort and status have
driven much of the change in the way the circuit courts decide cases
and much of thejudiciary's advocacy for restricting its own size. Judge
Reinhardt is brutal in his candor:
We federal judges are simply unable to abandon our notion of the
appellate courts as small, cohesive entities operating in a pristine
and sheltered atmosphere. It appears that, rather than surrender
298
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this wholly unrealistic and outdated vision of the federal judiciary,
many of us are willing to rationjustice, to eliminate some of the best
qualities we once associated with appellate decisionmaking, and to
shut the doors of the courts3 to the American people by severely re30
stricting our jurisdiction.
It is not only unfortunate, but also ironic, that this advocacy should
come from judges who have sworn to "administer justice without re30 4
spect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich."
V
THE ADVANTAGES OF EXPANSION

The preceding Part examined the arguments advanced by opponents of an enlarged federal judiciary. We believe that those arguments cannotjustify the continued maintenance of a small, elite corps
of circuit judges. A significant expansion of the circuit courts would
not come without some costs, of course, but such an expansion would
benefit society enormously. Most of the benefits should be apparent
from the earlier discussion. Nonetheless, they are worth repeating.
Far and away the most important gain from an enlarged judiciary
would be the extension of equal attention by the circuit judges to all
litigants-rich and poor, weak and powerful. Before the basic American dream of equal justice under the law can be realized, all cases
must be treated equally and with respect. That will not happen if
judges must continue to engage in triage merely to get through each
day's work.
A second important benefit of an expanded judiciary would be
the creation of more and better law. More judges, writing reasoned
opinions in all of the cases brought before them, will create a vast new
body of precedent. Contrary to the arguments of other writers on the
subject, those precedents will make the law more certain; and that
certainty will reduce the costs of all legal consumers and increase accessibility to the law. Computer data-bases will continue to make this
enlarged law easier to use. Because this body of precedent will be the
work of judges rather than staff, by definition, it will be better law.
Finally, enlarging the judiciary also will benefit society in a way
that this Article has not yet touched upon: An enlarged judiciary
would be more diverse culturally, geographically, and intellectually.
The predominant view in this country is that racial, ethnic, and gender diversity is a good in itself. That certainly makes sense for the
judiciary. It is very hard to believe that a culturally diverse bench does
not have different dynamics and thoughts from a uniform one.
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Achieving cultural diversity in the federal judiciary, however, is hampered by the slow turnover among the judges. Thus, as women and
minority applicants begin to achieve the seniority associated with service on the federal bench, there are relatively few openings for them.
A significant increase in the number ofjudges, however, would create
more appointment opportunities and would change the make-up of
the bench.
Expansion of the federal judiciary would also enhance diversity in
other ways. Circuit judges traditionally have been clustered in large
urban centers. The appointment of more judges would likely lead to
circuit judges haling from smaller cities or even rural areas. Those
newjudges would bring a different perspective to theirjob, a perspective which could easily affect the development of the law. Moreover,
judges from cities like Toledo or Omaha would affect the attitudes of
judges from bigger cities.3 0 5 Adding more judges would also diversify
the intellectual make-up of the courts. There would be more judges
coming from public agencies, public interest groups, law schools, and
small firms.3 0 6 The perspective of these representatives and of their
different constituencies would surely improve the quality of justice.
CONCLUSION

Congress established the United States courts of appeals to correct error at the district court level. For the first eighty years of their
existence, the circuit courts performed that function as a common law
appellate court should-visibly, collegially, personally, accountably,
and equitably. The judges provided visibility by hearing oral argument in almost all cases. Litigants could see first hand that the court
was familiar with their case and was willing and able to hear their arguments. A face-to-face conference of the panel followed argument, assuring a collective decision and allowing the judges to hear, consider,
and respond to each other's views. Back in chambers, and with the
help of a law clerk, the judges personally researched and wrote draft
opinions and then circulated those opinions to other panel members.
The courts guaranteed accountability by publishing most of those
opinions and standing by their precedential effect. Finally, the judges
used the same basic decisional method for almost all cases-large or
small, antitrust or social security-and for all litigants-rich or poor,
public or private, habitual or occasional. The court of appeals thus
505 Lawyers, clients, and judges will also benefit from a larger bench as it is likely that
panels will sit in more cities, thereby reducing travel time and expense.
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provided reassurance that the law and the courts treated all litigants
equally.
This decision making process, which we have called the appellate
ideal or the Learned Hand model, persisted until around 1970, when,
in response to an overwhelming increase in volume, the appellate
courts began to truncate the traditional model. Today, the circuit
courts hear oral argument and conduct meaningful face-to-face conferences in only half of the cases, with a resultant loss of visibility and
collegial input. Many cases get very little personal attention from the
judges. Most of the research and opinion drafting are the bureaucratic task of dozens of staff attorneys, who seldom confer with the
judges who are the titular authors of the opinions. Only a third of the
courts' opinions are published; the remainder exist in a quasiprecedential netherworld, vastly reducing judicial accountability. Finally, the courts have abandoned the notion of one appellate method
for all cases and all litigants. The significant cases, those brought by
wealthy, powerful, or institutional litigants-receive the traditional appellate model. The routine, trivial cases-usually the ones brought by
poorer, weaker litigants-are relegated to track-two appellate justice.
For these cases (about half the total) the circuit courts have become
certiorari courts, rather than the courts of mandatory appellate jurisdiction that Congress intended.
Bifurcation of the appellate process (i.e., triage) is not the only
available strategy for coping with the increase in appellate volume.
Our approach, which saves the traditional appellate model, is to increase the number of judgeships in proportion to increases in
caseload. The leadership of the judiciary (what we have called the
Judicial Establishment) has rejected that option and has argued and

lobbied consistently for restricting expansion.
The principal arguments offered against proportional increases
in the size of the judiciary are weak. The argument that expansion
would reduce the quality of the bench lacks empirical support. Judgeships are highly sought after and waiting lists are long. Moreover,
even if the average quality of the judges were to decrease slightly, the
average quality of appellate justice would increase because more cases
would receive traditional appellate justice, and fewer would be relegated to staff attorneys and clerks.
Judgeships are costly in absolute terms, but not when compared
to other national expenditures. For the amount that the federal government spends annually on the National Gallery of Art, circuit court
capacity could be brought close to adequate levels. Further, while excessive cost may be a reason for Congress to refuse to grant additional
judgeships, it is not an excuse for the judiciary to refuse to ask for
them. Other seekers of federal funds show no such reticence, nor do
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the judges themselves when it comes to expenditures for "imperial"
courthouses and other forms of support.
The unstable law hypothesis, like the quality of the bench argument, is contradicted by the only available empirical studies. Moreover, the argument wrongly presupposes that legal consistency is the
only goal of our appellate system; it discounts the equally important
goal of maintaining enough capacity to decide all cases carefully, correctly, and visibly. Finally, the unstable law argument ignores several
devices that could ensure legal consistency without sacrificing adequate capacity.
The jurisdictional retrenchment argument is a pipe-dream. Congress is not about to make radical cuts in federal jurisdiction to accommodate thejudiciary's desire to remain small, nor should it; the size of
the job should dictate the size of the tool, not vice versa.
The superficiality of these anti-expansion arguments suggests,
and some judges candidly admit, that the desire to maintain collegiality and prestige is a major reason for judicial opposition to expansion.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with seeking collegiality and prestige; most workers prefer higher status jobs in cordial, cooperative settings. And expansion might (although it is not clear that it will)
diminish one or both of those desiderata. The important question,
however, is how much should be sacrificed for the judges' prestige
and collegiality, and who will do the sacrificing. The level of prestige
and collegiality inure primarily to the benefit of the judges, while the
loss of capacity is endured by the nation and the litigants-mostly the
poor and powerless litigants. This externality, confirmed by the arrogance and elitism of some anti-expansion rhetoric, makes clear the
judiciary's conflict of interest. Further, it adds emphasis to this Article's major theme-the federal courts exist for the good of the nation,
not the judges. In what other enterprise, public or private, would we
tolerate a 50% loss of capacity in return for a minor fringe benefit for
the workers? It may be that the anti-expansion rhetoric represents the
views only of the judiciary's leadership and planning apparatus, and
not the majority of circuit judges. If so, it is time for Congress to hear
from the remainder, as well as from the bar and the public. There is
still time to save the Learned Hand tradition in the circuit courts-but
not much.

